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FINDING COMMON GROUND ACROSS RACE AND RELIGION: 
JUDICIAL CONCEPTIONS OF POLITICAL COMMUNITY 
IN PUBLIC SCHOOLS 
 
Stuart Chinn* 
 
Abstract 
This article opens with a brief discussion of the recent controversies 
over race, inclusion, and community on American college campuses, 
focusing on the events at Yale University during the 2015 fall semester. 
Yale’s controversy is fascinating as one of the most recent, high-profile 
events that invites a discussion of a deep and persistent issue in 
American society: how do we construct and maintain a stable political 
community characterized by enduring differences? I use the Yale 
example as my jumping-off point for interrogating this question in the 
context of Supreme Court cases on race and public education, and 
religion/ideology and public education.  
My focus on judicial opinions dealing with public education is 
motivated by several considerations: elementary and secondary public 
schools, in particular, constitute perhaps the most direct point of contact 
between most American children and the state. Thus, these institutions 
have the opportunity to shape future participants in the American 
political community and to impart the particular values that will help 
constitute that community. Relatedly, my focus on judicial conceptions of 
political community in the public school context provides the key 
attraction of hearing major national political actors discuss these themes 
within the illuminating format of principle-based judicial opinions. 
Given this, and given the centrality of public education, racial identity, 
and religious identity in American society, I am presuming that the 
dynamics that these judicial opinions illuminate will illuminate the 
dynamics present within other types of communities in America. 
In this article, I make three primary claims. First, within the 
judicial opinions that grapple with racial and religious/ideological 
difference in the context of public education, one might glean a set of 
judicial beliefs common to both regarding the adhesive force of public 
education in creating and maintaining political community. More 
precisely, I will claim that judges have seen public schools as a cultural 
adhesive force across both types of plurality. The specific manner in 
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which public schools bind students together is by virtue of the physical 
proximity of students to one another, and their observation in, 
participation in, and creation of a common culture. 
However, this doctrinal comparison yields a key difference too, and 
this constitutes my second claim: in the race and public education 
context, the central problem that has appeared in the doctrine—and the 
main problem that has animated judicial conceptions of community in 
that context—has been the problem of community-creation. Judges have 
largely pondered the justifications and limits upon the state’s authority 
to create racial plurality in public schools. Such arguments proceed from 
background assumptions of minimal racial plurality absent the 
contemplated state actions. In contrast, in the religion/ideology and 
public education context, the major cases and judicial arguments on 
plurality within public schools are preoccupied with the problems of 
community-maintenance. Judges have pondered the justifications and 
limits upon state actions toward maintaining stable communities in 
public schools in the face of individual claims of religious freedom and 
competing state claims favoring uniformity. The background 
presumption in these cases is one of inevitable religious/ideological 
plurality in public schools, even absent the contemplated state actions.  
Finally, I offer a third and final claim: for community-builders, 
maintenance problems are easier than creation problems. This point, in 
turn, suggests that, while plurality may be inevitable, plurality within a 
communal structure holds greater hope for lines of division to be 
overcome. This is because the culture intrinsic to a community can serve 
as an adhesive across lines of division. Thus, to the extent that one finds 
the goals of community and unity to be worthwhile, at least some of the 
time, this observation implies that mechanisms that situate plurality 
within community are often preferable to letting plurality persist between 
distinct communities. 
 
In recent months, much commentary has been written on student activism and 
engagement in racial issues on university campuses. These events intersect with 
some of the deepest and most important themes in American law and politics. 
Among those themes are three in particular, which are the focus of this article: 
uniformity, diversity, and community. Consider the events at Yale University, one 
of the most discussed recent instances of campus debate.1 As has been detailed in a 
                                                
1 See, e.g., Jelani Cobb, Race and the Free Speech Diversion, NEW YORKER (Nov. 11, 
2015), http://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/race-and-the-free-speech-diversion 
[https://perma.cc/7GN8-LCVB] (discussing the unrest that occurred at Yale University); 
Jelani Cobb, What Divides Us?: An Interview with Yale College Dean Jonathan Holloway, 
NEW YORKER (Nov. 15, 2015), http://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/what-divides-
us-an-interview-with-yale-college-dean-jonathan-holloway [https://perma.cc/SN3C-4S98] 
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number of publications, an initial email by the Yale Intercultural Affairs 
Committee in late October 2015 urged students to be sensitive and judicious in 
their choice of Halloween costumes. The email stated:  
 
Yale is a community that values free expression as well as inclusivity. 
And while students, undergraduate and graduate, definitely have a right 
to express themselves, we would hope that people would actively avoid 
those circumstances that threaten our sense of community or disrespects, 
alienates or ridicules segments of our population based on race, 
nationality, religious belief or gender expression.2 
 
                                                
(discussing an interview the Dean of Yale College); David Cole, Yale: The Power of 
Speech, N.Y. REV. BOOKS (Nov. 18, 2015), http://www.nybooks.com/daily/2015/11/18/ 
yale-power-of-speech/ [https://perma.cc/WH5D-R4HA] (discussing the controversy 
surrounding Yale protests and similar controversies on other college campuses); Conor 
Friedersdorf, The New Intolerance of Student Activism, THE ATLANTIC (Nov. 9, 2015), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/11/the-new-intolerance-of-student-
activism-at-yale/414810/ [https://perma.cc/D2TY-GLXB] (discussing the nature of 
modern-day student activism); Todd Gitlin, Why Are Student Protesters So Fearful?, N.Y. 
TIMES: THE OPINION PAGES (Nov. 21, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/22/opinio
n/sunday/why-are-student-protesters-so-fearful.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/4BMG-VG67] 
(discussing the message students convey in response to Yale events); Nicholas Kristof, 
Mizzou, Yale and Free Speech, N.Y. TIMES: THE OPINION PAGES (Nov. 11, 2015), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/12/opinion/mizzou-yale-and-free-speech.html [https:// 
perma.cc/4HTN-TCBH] (discussing students across the nation speaking about racial 
tensions in universities, specifically University of Missouri and Yale); Suzanne Nossel, 
Opinion Editorial, Who Is Entitled to Be Heard?, N.Y. TIMES: THE OPINION PAGES (Nov. 
12, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/12/opinion/who-is-entitled-to-be-heard.html 
[https://perma.cc/6TYB-QHZW] (discussing racial tensions at Yale and consequent 
protests); Meghan O’Rourke, Yale’s Unsafe Spaces, NEW YORKER: CULTURAL COMMENT 
(Nov. 13, 2015), http://www.newyorker.com/culture/cultural-comment/yales-unsafe-spaces 
[https://perma.cc/6TRQ-RTB7] (discussing the rights and reasonable “expectations” of 
students at Yale); George Packer, A Hard Rain at Mizzou and Yale, NEW YORKER: DAILY 
COMMENT (Nov. 14, 2015), http://www.newyorker.com/news/daily-comment/the-
struggles-at-mizzou-and-yale [https://perma.cc/X9AF-N9AY] (discussing students at Yale 
and University of Missouri protesting racial oppression); Liam Stack, Yale’s Halloween 
Advice Stokes a Racially Charged Debate, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 8, 2015), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/09/nyregion/yale-culturally-insensitive-halloween-
costumes-free-speech.html [https://perma.cc/JV8P-59NV] (discussing racial tension at 
Yale); Rachel L. Swarns, Yale College Dean Torn by Racial Protests, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 
15, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/16/nyregion/yale-college-dean-torn-by-
racial-protests.html [https://perma.cc/76A8-CGRD] (discussing the struggles of the Dean 
of Yale College over student protests).   
2 FIRE, Email from the Intercultural Affairs Committee, FOUND. FOR INDIVIDUAL 
RTS. IN EDUC. (Oct. 27, 2015), https://www.thefire.org/email-from-intercultural-affairs/ 
[https://perma.cc/RY6F-2XYL].  
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Following this, Erika Christakis, the associate master of Silliman College (one of 
Yale’s residential colleges), sent an email to the students in that college expressing 
qualms about the Intercultural Affairs Committee’s email for being somewhat 
paternalistic. As her email stated in part: 
 
I don’t wish to trivialize genuine concerns about cultural and personal 
representation, and other challenges to our lived experience in a plural 
community. I know that many decent people have proposed guidelines 
on Halloween costumes from a spirit of avoiding hurt and offense. I laud 
those goals, in theory, as most of us do. But in practice, I wonder if we 
should reflect more transparently, as a community, on the consequences 
of an institutional (which is to say: bureaucratic and administrative) 
exercise of implied control over college students.3 
 
Christakis’s email, however, prompted a strong negative reaction from at least a 
portion of the student body,4 and many quickly linked the email to broader 
concerns about race at Yale. Among other items, related topics included the 
underrepresentation of racial minorities in the faculty5 and the visible legacy of 
slavery on campus—most notably in the form of a residential college being named 
for John C. Calhoun.6 A video of Nicholas Christakis—the spouse of Erika 
Christakis and the master of Silliman College—engaging in a heated discussion 
with a visibly upset student in the aftermath of the email exchange went viral and 
helped to elevate this debate in the public consciousness.7   
Some individuals articulated their views in detail in an “Open Letter to 
Associate Master Christakis” by “Concerned Yale Students, Alumni, Family, 
Faculty, and Staff.” As the letter concluded:  
 
To be a student of color on Yale’s campus is to exist in a space that was 
not created for you. From the Eurocentric courses, to the lack of diversity 
in the faculty, to the names of slave owners and traders that adorn most 
of the buildings on campus—all are reminders that Yale’s history is one 
of exclusion. An exclusion that was based on the same stereotypes and 
                                                
3 FIRE, Email from Erika Christakis: “Dressing Yourselves,” email to Silliman 
College (Yale) Students on Halloween Costumes, FOUND. FOR INDIVIDUAL RTS. IN EDUC. 
(Oct. 30, 2015), https://www.thefire.org/email-from-erika-christakis-dressing-yourselves-
email-to-silliman-college-yale-students-on-halloween-costumes/ [https://perma.cc/8VEJ-
RT23].  
4 Cole, supra note 1; Stack, supra note 1; Swarns, supra note 1.   
5 Cole, supra note 1. 
6 Noah Remnick, Yale Grapples with Ties to Slavery in Debate over a College’s 
Name, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 11, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/12/nyregion/yale-
in-debate-over-calhoun-college-grapples-with-ties-to-slavery.html [https://perma.cc/SV3L-
7SSG]; Stack, supra note 1. 
7 Cole, supra note 1; Stack, supra note 1. 
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incorrect beliefs that students now seek to wear as costumes. Stereotypes 
that many students still face to this day when navigating the university. 
The purpose of blackface, yellowface, and practices like these were 
meant to alienate, denigrate, and to portray people of color as something 
inferior and unwelcome in society. To see that replicated on college 
campuses only reinforces the idea that this is a space in which we do not 
belong.8   
 
Continued engagement between students and the Yale administration subsequently 
led to the articulation of a broader plan for campus diversity by university 
president Peter Salovey. In the opening paragraphs of his message, Salovey states: 
 
I have heard the expressions of those who do not feel fully included at 
Yale, many of whom have described experiences of isolation, and even 
of hostility, during their time here. It is clear that we need to make 
significant changes so that all members of our community truly feel 
welcome and can participate equally in the activities of the university, 
and to reaffirm and reinforce our commitment to a campus where hatred 
and discrimination are never tolerated. 
 
We begin this work by laying to rest the claim that it conflicts with our 
commitment to free speech, which is unshakeable. The very purpose of 
our gathering together into a university community is to engage in 
teaching, learning, and research — to study and think together, 
sometimes to argue with and challenge one another, even at the risk of 
discord, but always to take care to preserve our ability to learn from one 
another.9 
  
                                                
8 Ryan Wilson, Open Letter to Associate Master Christakis, DOWN MAG. (Oct. 31, 
2015), http://downatyale.com/post.php?id=430 [https://perma.cc/VA2Y-WBEU].  
9 Peter Salovey, Statement from President Salovey: Toward a Better Yale, 
YALENEWS (Nov. 17, 2015), http://news.yale.edu/2015/11/17/statement-president-salovey-
toward-better-yale [https://perma.cc/7VCK-SNUY]. 
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As noted above, a number of important questions on racial identity, racial equality, 
and free speech underlie these disagreements. But most pertinent for this Article is 
the underlying presumption of “community” in all of these quoted statements. All 
of the statements invoke an ideal vision of community characterized by a form of 
unity or commonality—whether that might be an equality of concern and respect 
for all members, equal inclusion, or equal opportunity to speak (and to be 
disagreed with). At the same time, each statement contemplates the notion of an 
ideal community characterized by difference—whether that might be racial, 
cultural, or ethnic difference, or difference characterized by divergent viewpoints 
and sensibilities. 
 
*** 
 
Of course, as far as major political disagreements in American history go, the 
case of Yale in 2015 offers a relatively mild example. Aside from the fact that Yale 
is a privileged institution,10 one suspects that there is a limit beyond which political 
disagreements will never escalate, if only because its students, faculty, and staff 
are thrown together into a community that is characterized by a degree of intimacy, 
geographic proximity, and transience that while common to many university 
communities, may be quite uncommon in comparison to other sectors of American 
life. Still, even if the Yale example may have limited relevance for other 
contexts—at least in certain respects—its invocation of the notion of community 
speaks strongly to the timeliness of inquiries about community at present. The 
Yale case serves to remind us that such debates over community, commonality, 
and difference are persistent in our society.   
Indeed, references to “culture wars” have long been a staple in American 
social and political life.11 Such debates have often raised the specter of enduring 
differences in America, but at times have carried much less optimism than some of 
the Yale speakers about a broader community being capable of overcoming 
differences.12 In this regard, consider two quotations referencing the debate within 
                                                
10 Phoebe Maltz Bovy, Who’s Afraid of Yale Student Privilege?, NEW REPUBLIC 
(Nov. 16, 2015), https://newrepublic.com/article/123912/whos-afraid-of-yale-student-
privilege [https://perma.cc/T4S4-STBG]. 
11 Probably the most recent version of these debates, prior to those in the present, 
were in the 1990s. See generally JAMES DAVISON HUNTER, CULTURE WARS: THE 
STRUGGLE TO DEFINE AMERICA (1991) (discussing the culture war surrounding education); 
ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE DISUNITING OF AMERICA: REFLECTIONS ON A 
MULTICULTURAL SOCIETY (1992) (discussing studies on different cultures present in 
society); Diane Ravitch, Multiculturalism: E Pluribus Plures, 59 AM. SCHOLAR 337 (1990) 
(discussing how race, ethnicity, and religion have always been a source of conflict in 
American education). 
12 See, e.g., John Higham’s prominent study of activism in American history. 
Nativism is defined by historian John Higham as follows:  
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the Supreme Court over mandatory flag salutes in public schools in the 1940s. In 
defense of the mandatory flag salute in Minersville v. Gobitis,13 Justice Frankfurter 
stated:  
 
The ultimate foundation of a free society is the binding tie of cohesive 
sentiment. Such a sentiment is fostered by all those agencies of the mind 
and spirit which may serve to gather up the traditions of a people, 
transmit them from generation to generation, and thereby create that 
continuity of a treasured common life which constitutes a civilization. 
‘We live by symbols.’ The flag is the symbol of our national unity, 
transcending all internal differences, however large, within the 
framework of the Constitution.14 
 
However, in later overruling Gobitis in the subsequent case of West Virginia State 
Board of Education v. Barnette,15 Justice Jackson stated for the Court that:  
 
Probably no deeper division of our people could proceed from any 
provocation than from finding it necessary to choose what doctrine and 
whose program public educational officials shall compel youth to unite 
in embracing. Ultimate futility of such attempts to compel coherence is 
the lesson of every such effort from the Roman drive to stamp out 
Christianity as a disturber of its pagan unity, the Inquisition, as a means 
to religious and dynastic unity, the Siberian exiles as a means to Russian 
unity, down to the fast failing efforts of our present totalitarian enemies. 
Those who begin coercive elimination of dissent soon find themselves 
exterminating dissenters. Compulsory unification of opinion achieves 
only the unanimity of the graveyard.16 
                                                
Whether the nativist was a workingman or a Protestant evangelist, a southern 
conservative or a northern reformer, he stood for a certain kind of nationalism. 
He believed—whether he was trembling at a Catholic menace to American 
liberty, fearing an invasion of pauper labor, or simply rioting against the great 
English actor William Macready—that some influence originating abroad 
threatened the very life of the nation from within. Nativism, therefore, should be 
defined as intense opposition to an internal minority on the ground of its foreign 
(i.e., “un-American”) connections . . . . While drawing on much broader cultural 
antipathies and ethnocentric judgments, nativism translates them into a zeal to 
destroy the enemies of a distinctively American way of life. 
 
JOHN HIGHAM, STRANGERS IN THE LAND: PATTERNS OF AMERICAN NATIVISM, 1860–1925 4 
(2008).   
13 310 U.S. 586 (1940). 
14 Id. at 596. 
15 319 U.S. 624 (1943). 
16 Id. at 641. 
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The exchange between Frankfurter and Jackson hints at perhaps the fundamental 
problem of American political community: in a society that will always be marked 
by some degree of pluralism, diversity must be accommodated if stability is to be 
maintained. Yet, even if Frankfurter’s position may seem far out of line with 
modern sentiments, it does hint at a question that continues to occupy us: is there a 
point at which a community cannot and should not accommodate pluralism in the 
name of unity?17 On the one hand, a society or community characterized by too 
much plurality will have little within it to provide a common ground for bridging 
differences and binding community members together across the major lines of 
division. Yet, as Jackson notes,18 too much of an emphasis on unity by the state or 
majorities—as a means to contain or remedy those societal differences—opens the 
door for equally worrisome concerns about the coercion of individuals and 
repression of differences. 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
This article attempts to probe at these questions of unity and difference in the 
American political community by examining judicial rulings on public 
education—specifically judicial rulings dealing with race and public education, 
and judicial rulings dealing with religiously-based or ideologically-based 
differences and public education.19 There are obviously a number of potentially 
fruitful avenues for interrogating these questions. But the focus of this inquiry on 
judicial opinions dealing with public education possesses some obvious attractions. 
For example, because elementary and secondary public schools perhaps constitute 
the most direct point of contact between most American children and the state, 
these institutions have the opportunity to shape future participants in the American 
political community and to impart the particular values that will help constitute 
                                                
17 Rawls opens the exploration of his theory of “political liberalism” by asking this 
fundamental question: “how is it possible for there to exist over time a stable and just 
society of free and equal citizens profoundly divided by reasonable religious, 
philosophical, and moral doctrines?” JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM xxvii (1996). 
18 See infra Part III. 
19 Among the cases I discuss that touch on religiously-based and ideologically-based 
plurality in public schools, the focus of most is on religion. Still, I will alternately refer to 
these cases as dealing with “religion” or “religion/ideology.”  Judges and scholars have 
attempted to articulate how and why religiously-based beliefs should be treated differently 
from nonreligious beliefs. See, e.g., ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: 
PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 1231–36 (4th ed. 2011) (discussing religion and the 
Constitution). Yet, I largely treat the two similarly because the commonly-noted 
distinctions matter less for my purposes.  In my argument, both are juxtaposed to race-
based plurality, and within this comparison, the issues surrounding religiously-based and 
ideologically-based plurality overlap with each other to a much greater extent than either 
overlaps with race-based plurality in public schools. 
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that community. Not surprisingly then, the topic of education has drawn the 
sustained attention of scholars focused on some of the deepest questions of 
American democracy and society.20 
Relatedly, my focus on judicial conceptions of political community in the 
public school context provides the key attraction of hearing governing actors 
examine these questions in the very fruitful context of judicial opinions. Within 
this form of political communication, we see judges discuss themes such as the 
pivotal role public schools play in shaping future American citizens, what binds 
Americans together into a political community, and what points of divergence may 
be desirable, acceptable, undesirable, or prohibited under the law. And 
importantly, judges have often discussed these themes, at times, in the language of 
abstract political, legal, and ethical principles. Thus, even if judicial conceptions of 
political community may only reflect beliefs specific to a subset of Americans, 
they have often been stated with admirable clarity, and they have likely been 
representative of some of the most influential conceptions of political community. 
Beyond this focus on education and the judiciary, why focus specifically on 
racial and religious differences? First, race and religion have historically 
constituted two of the most significant dimensions of cleavage or segmentation in 
American society. This history commends these two doctrinal areas as attractive 
contexts for interrogating judicial thoughts on unity and difference. One suspects 
that judicial consideration of questions of unity and difference in these cases is 
aided and enriched by, for example, the weighty background of Jim Crow school 
segregation,21 or the extended history of Catholic-Protestant conflict in the context 
of elementary and secondary education.22 Second, the comparison of race and 
religion seems ripe for drawing out some key differences between these two 
contexts as well. With the former, we are dealing with a dimension of identity that 
is largely treated in constitutional doctrine as central and immutable to individuals. 
Religion, on the other hand, while also commonly recognized as central and 
somewhat intergenerational, is not an immutable dimension of identity and thus 
diverges in some respects from how many view matters of race, gender, and sexual 
                                                
20 See, e.g., EAMONN CALLAN, CREATING CITIZENS: POLITICAL EDUCATION AND 
LIBERAL DEMOCRACY 2–7 (1997) (discussing what gets excluded from political debate 
about education); AMY GUTMANN, DEMOCRATIC EDUCATION 11–13 (1987) (discussing the 
goals of a democratic education); MEIRA LEVINSON, THE DEMANDS OF LIBERAL 
EDUCATION 132–70 (1999) (discussing education policy); MORAL AND POLITICAL 
EDUCATION 1–19 (Stephen Macedo & Yael Tamir eds., 2002) (discussing education in a 
liberal democracy); STEPHEN MACEDO, DIVERSITY AND DISTRUST: CIVIC EDUCATION IN A 
MULTICULTURAL DEMOCRACY 231–54 (2000) (discussing civic purposes and public 
schools). 
21 See infra Section II.A. 
22 MACEDO, supra note 20, at 41; DAVID TYACK, SEEKING COMMON GROUND: PUBLIC 
SCHOOLS IN A DIVERSE SOCIETY 23–24 (2003). 
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orientation.23 Exploring how the Court articulates its vision of political community 
across two similar but distinct forms of individual identity thus presents 
opportunities to analyze and contrast them. 
In this article, I make three primary claims. First, when we examine the key 
cases on race and public education, and religion/ideology and public education, we 
see similar language from the Supreme Court emphasizing the crucial role of 
public schools in serving as an adhesive force in American society across both 
racial and religious difference. I further assert that the Court has viewed public 
schools as crucial in helping to forge a common culture across racial and religious 
lines. Second, these key cases also demonstrate a crucial point of divergence. 
While the judiciary has primarily been concerned with problems of political 
community-creation in the race context, it has primarily been concerned with 
problems of political community-maintenance in the religion/ideological context. 
Finally, for community-builders confronting stubborn lines of division, problems 
of maintenance are generally preferable to problems of community-creation. 
 
A.  Adhesive Structures in American Society and Cultural Commonality 
 
Before elaborating on my primary claims, however, let me first clarify some 
preliminary concepts. Much of what follows in this article will be a discussion of 
racial and religious/ideological plurality, but some discussion is warranted up front 
regarding the opposing force in these questions: the adhesive or cohesive 
mechanisms that function to bind members of the American political community 
together. In this vein, consider first John Higham’s delineation of three forms of 
unity, or three types of “cohesive structures” that, he argued, have historically 
                                                
23 In Reynolds v. United States, the Supreme Court affirmed the indictment of George 
Reynolds for engaging in bigamy in violation of federal law. Consider this statement by the 
Court on the difference between religiously-motivated conduct versus religious belief—
thereby drawing a sharp outer limit to how far it would respect religious identity, and 
underscoring the dimensions of both “conduct” and “status” for religious identity:  
 
This being so, the only question which remains is, whether those who make 
polygamy a part of their religion are excepted from the operation of the statute. 
If they are, then those who do not make polygamy a part of their religious belief 
may be found guilty and punished, while those who do, must be acquitted and 
go free. This would be introducing a new element into criminal law. Laws are 
made for the government of actions, and while they cannot interfere with mere 
religious belief and opinions, they may with practices. Suppose one believed 
that human sacrifices were a necessary part of religious worship, would it be 
seriously contended that the civil government under which he lived could not 
interfere to prevent a sacrifice? Or if a wife religiously believed it was her duty 
to burn herself upon the funeral pile of her dead husband, would it be beyond the 
power of the civil government to prevent her carrying her belief into practice? 
 
98 U.S. 145, 166 (1878). 
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helped constitute American society to different degrees.24 These cohesive 
structures include (a) “primordial unity,” which Higham defined as “a corporate 
feeling of oneness that infuses a particular, concrete, unquestioned set of inherited 
relationships.”25 Within this category, Higham has in mind very localized, specific 
interpersonal connections firmly rooted within a community defined by location 
and/or a complex web of family, extended family, neighbor, and friendship 
relations.26 Next there is (b) “ideological unity,” which Higham defined as 
“explicit systems of general beliefs that give large bodies of people a common 
identity and purpose, a common program of action, and a standard for self-
criticism.”27 Of interest for Higham in this regard were two ideologies in 
particular: American Protestantism and American nationalism.28 Finally, perhaps 
of least relevance for our purposes, Higham also discussed (c) “technical unity,” 
which he defined as “a reordering of human relations by rational procedures 
designed to maximize efficiency. Technical unity connects people by occupation 
function rather than ideological faith.”29   
Higham acknowledged that these three forms of unity were hardly exhaustive 
of all cohesive structures in American history.30 Indeed, while they are quite useful 
in understanding a range of contexts and historical eras, none seems to fully speak 
to the kind of unity or adhesive force that would be capable of binding a large, 
pluralistic society together in the face of racially-based or religiously-based 
plurality. For example, primordial forms of unity would seem to have little 
relevance in larger social units. Technical forms of unity would seem to have little 
relevance beyond clearly defined, collective endeavors in the commercial context. 
Of the three, perhaps ideological forms of unity come closest to having relevance 
for our purposes. Yet even ideology—at least if it is understood as an appeal to 
abstract principles such as, say, liberty or equality—still seems insufficient on its 
own to explain large-scale American societal cohesion across racial or religious 
lines. My skepticism stems from two concerns: First, given that abstract concepts 
such as liberty or equality have broad international, if not near-universal appeal, it 
is not obvious why such concepts would be central in binding Americans, 
specifically, together within an American political community. That is, why would 
a strong commitment to these ideals between two or more individuals necessarily 
                                                
24 I have previously discussed Higham and several of the other authors in this section 
in the context of examining judicial and scholarly arguments about abortion rights 
alongside debates over American political community. Stuart Chinn, Universal Arguments 
and Particular Arguments on Abortion Rights, 75 MD. L. REV. 247, 267–69 (2015). 
25 JOHN HIGHAM, HANGING TOGETHER: UNITY AND DIVERSITY IN AMERICAN 
CULTURE 5 (Carl J. Guarneri ed., 2001). 
26 Id. at 5–7. 
27 Id. at 7–8. The emphasis on ideology as a cornerstone of American political 
identity is a common theme in the literature.  
28 HIGHAM, supra note 25, at 8–14. 
29 Id. at 14. 
30 Id. at 5. 
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identify each to the other as American, or create an expectation that they would 
find a shared connection around their national identity? 
Second, and relatedly, given the abstractness of these ideals, they are by 
definition open to interpretation and sometimes wildly different applications. It is 
questionable then how strong a foundation such ideals could provide for forging 
connections between members of a political community—particularly if strong, 
political disagreements lurk in the background. This is not to deny that there may 
be stability-promoting or adhesive benefits to common societal acceptance of 
vague, but attractive, political ideals. Vague and contestable conceptions of 
equality and liberty, for example, have likely contributed, at times, to the stability 
of the American governmental system in providing conceptual space for competing 
political parties and competing constituencies to continue dialoging with each 
other. Still, such benefits of ambiguity seem much more likely to characterize 
political communities already structured by other, more fundamental adhesive 
forces. That is to say, abstract ideals could be a supplementary cohesive force, but 
it is not clear that on their own they could provide much sense of deep belonging 
and connection. 
Others have elaborated on the ideological theme and focused on political 
narratives as crucial in providing cohesion to American society.31 Such arguments 
                                                
31 David Hollinger emphasizes the importance of civic nationalism as a cohesive 
force for Americans, hinting at a nationalism based in ideology and in culture (though the 
emphasis seems to be more on the former). Hollinger, however, does not elaborate in much 
detail on the content of this civic nationalism, since his focus is more on developing a 
“postethnic” ideal in the context of individual identity. DAVID HOLLINGER, POSTETHNIC 
AMERICA: BEYOND MULTICULTURALISM 134, 140, 215–16 (Rev. ed. 2005). Similar to 
Hollinger, Kenneth Karst also emphasizes “civic culture” as the primary adhesive force in 
American society. Kenneth L. Karst, Paths to Belonging: The Constitution and Cultural 
Identity, 64 N.C. L. REV. 303, 361–77 (1986). In a somewhat different vein, consider 
arguments put forth by Rogers Smith and Gary Gerstle. Smith has emphasized “stories of 
peoplehood” as a crucial adhesive structure in creating and maintaining political 
community. In this regard, Smith emphasizes the importance of three kinds or types of 
stories of peoplehood: economic stories, political power stories, and ethically constitutive 
stories. ROGERS M. SMITH, STORIES OF PEOPLEHOOD: THE POLITICS AND MORALS OF 
POLITICAL MEMBERSHIP 60 (2003). Of particular interest for our purposes, Smith defines 
ethically constitutive stories as follows: “Such stories proclaim that members’ culture, 
religion, language, race, ethnicity, ancestry, history, or other such factors are constitutive of 
their very identities as persons, in ways that both affirm their worth and delineate their 
obligations.” Id. at 64–65. Relatedly, Gary Gerstle has written on the existence of a civic 
nationalist narrative in American politics that has coexisted with a racial nationalist 
narrative—focusing in particular on the twentieth century. See GARY GERSTLE, AMERICAN 
CRUCIBLE: RACE AND NATION IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 5–13 (2002). To the extent that 
Smith and Gerstle are read to be in support of more ideologically-based adhesive 
structures, I would offer the same critiques to their arguments that are mentioned above. If, 
however, Smith and Gerstle’s theories are open to the notion of more culturally-based 
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often address the first concern noted above in emphasizing how certain abstract 
principles—when situated within a historical narrative specific to events and 
individuals in American history—could provide bonds of community that are 
peculiarly American. And yet, I remain skeptical that even historically grounded 
ideological narratives can entirely explain why Americans would necessarily feel 
bound to one another in a lasting, substantive way. More likely, such civic 
narratives would often seem to function more symbolically as representative of 
communal bonds that already exist. That is, they are more likely an unthinking 
point of reference to symbolize and concretize such bonds. For any American self-
consciously reflecting on why they feel a sense of connection with another 
American, however, it strikes me as questionable that foremost in their mind would 
be a replay of high school civics or a reference to distant historical figures.  
I would tentatively propose that at least in the context of society-wide 
connections in America that are not primarily constituted by other types of 
relationships (geographic, professional, economic, personal, etc.), a crucial 
adhesive force is ultimately cultural. Such cultural influences can be partly 
ideological in nature, and may be partly dependent upon abstract notions of 
equality, liberty and/or more historically grounded ideological narratives. But more 
centrally, I use the term “culture” to refer to a connection or bond that is rooted in 
experience and interaction—something more grounded rather than abstract. My 
references to “culture” below thus refer to a set of common experiences, common 
cultural reference points, everyday norms, traditions, and spatial references (such 
as buildings, streets, and landmarks) that two or more individuals may feel a 
connection to by virtue of having been in the same kinds of places at the same 
moments in time (or at the same stages in life). In short, these are markers of 
community and belongingness that are not the high-minded points of commonality 
that one necessarily invokes in speeches about America. Rather, these are the items 
that constitute everyday experiences that may largely exist in the background, and 
that may only come into focus when individuals find themselves in a context 
where suddenly certain items are not taken for granted as common.   
I should note that for these aspects of culture to serve as an adhesive structure 
across community, what is crucial is not whether such experiences actually are 
common to all members. Rather, the adhesive function of culture as I define it 
stems more from the plausible perception of commonality.32 Thus, this notion of a 
                                                
forms of adhesion, as I define them in the main text, my argument may indeed align with 
their emphasis on the importance of narratives in structuring political community. 
32 One of the more prominent arguments in defense of the notion that culture 
constitutes the core of American political identity is MICHAEL LIND, THE NEXT AMERICAN 
NATION: THE NEW NATIONALISM AND THE FOURTH AMERICAN REVOLUTION 5–15 (1995). 
As he states, “[a] real nation is a concrete historical community, defined primarily by a 
common language, common folkways, and a common vernacular culture.” Id. at 5. Lind’s 
belief that there actually is a common culture defined by common norms and experiences is 
distinct from what I am suggesting here. There may be such a common ground as an 
empirical matter, though I am skeptical. The common culture that I refer to above is 
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cultural adhesive force that is rooted in perception builds upon Benedict 
Anderson’s famous description of national political communities as, in part, 
“imagined communities” of individuals who would never know or meet each 
other.33 Speaking directly to the notion of shared experiences (or perceived shared 
experiences) creating cohesion within the national political community, Anderson 
states the following in discussing the cohesive force of newspapers, specifically:  
 
The obsolescence of the newspaper on the morrow of its 
printing . . . nonetheless, for just this reason, creates this extraordinary 
mass ceremony: the almost precisely simultaneous consumption 
(“imagining”) of the newspaper-as-fiction. We know that particular 
morning and evening editions will overwhelmingly be consumed 
between this hour and that, only on this day, not that . . . The significance 
of this mass ceremony . . . is paradoxical. It is performed in silent 
privacy, in the lair of the skull. Yet each communicant is well aware that 
the ceremony he performs is being replicated simultaneously by 
thousands (or millions) of others of whose existence he is confident, yet 
of whose identity he has not the slightest notion.  Furthermore, this 
ceremony is incessantly repeated at daily or half-daily intervals 
throughout the calendar. What more vivid figure for the secular, 
historically clocked, imagined community can be envisioned?34 
 
Recognizing the crucial role of perceptions in binding Americans together 
implies that these bonds may be frayed if individuals perceive that their 
experiences are widely divergent from certain segments of Americans. The role of 
cultural perceptions also indicates that the state has a potentially useful role to play 
in cultivating societal cohesion by facilitating the perception of common 
experiences, and indeed, such a role aligns with how judges and theorists of 
American society have viewed public education over time. 
 
B.  Judicial Conceptions of Community in Public Schools 
 
Having articulated some preliminary thoughts on American political 
community and some of the forces at work in binding community members 
together, let me conclude this part by beginning to flesh out what will be the focus 
of this Article: plurality within the American political community. As an initial 
point, it is worth emphasizing that political community in America is obviously not 
                                                
premised in part upon actual conditions in American life and individual perceptions of 
American life. In many cases, I suspect, the perception is more crucial in binding 
Americans together than the reality.  
33 BENEDICT ANDERSON, IMAGINED COMMUNITIES: REFLECTIONS ON THE ORIGIN AND 
SPREAD OF NATIONALISM 6–7 (rev. ed. 1991). 
34 Id. at 35, 42–45 (citations omitted).  
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a monolithic entity. More accurately, and as suggested by Higham’s comments 
quoted above, American society is characterized by multiple forms of community 
and multiple lines of division. My focus here is on conceptions of political 
community in public schools, where the primary concerns are racial and religious 
differences. The dynamics I will discuss may be different to greater or lesser 
degrees in other contexts of American community-building. Still, given the 
centrality of public education, racial identity, and religious identity, I am 
presuming that the dynamics discussed here will partially illuminate other types of 
community in America as well. 
In examining the community-building role of public schools in the context of 
both racial and religious/ideological difference, I find that a comparison of these 
two doctrinal areas ultimately yields three key findings. The first is a point of 
similarity across the racial and religious contexts that I examine in Part II. Within 
the judiciary’s opinions that grapple with racial and religious/ideological 
difference in the context of public education, one might glean a set of judicial 
beliefs common to both contexts on the adhesive force of public education in 
creating and maintaining political community. Judges see public schools as a 
unifying force across both types of plurality. More precisely, and in line with 
preceding comments, I will claim that judges have, at least implicitly, seen public 
schools as providing a cultural adhesive influence. Public schools bind members 
together via the physical proximity of students to one another and their observation 
in, participation in, and creation of a common culture. 
My focus on culture in this context underscores the point that, at least as 
judges have discussed the functions of public schools in these cases, they have not 
viewed the cohesiveness of political community (as represented by the public 
school) as being merely ideological in nature. If that were the case, presumably 
political community could be cultivated by the teaching of common ideals in a 
variety of schools separated by race and/or religion. The desire for physical 
proximity between students of different races and religions implied in these cases 
would seem unnecessary. The fact that students’ physical exposure to plurality is a 
concern for judges speaks to the importance the latter have often placed on the 
adhesive benefits of culture. That is, what we glean from these cases is a judicial 
belief in how ideals grounded in discrete experiences can bind students together. 
If both the race and religion/ideology cases overlap in demonstrating a 
common judicial belief in how public schools can nurture a cohesive common 
culture, they also overlap in another sense: these cases also set forth clearly 
demarcated limits on the ability of the state to utilize public schools toward these 
cohesive ends. While the particular limits differ across the race and 
religious/ideological contexts, judges have viewed these limits as a constraint upon 
the community-building functions that public schools may perform in either 
context.  
This doctrinal comparison between race and religion/ideology yields a key 
difference too, and this constitutes my second primary claim that I flesh out in Part 
III: in the race and public education context, the central problem that has appeared 
in the doctrine—and the main problem that has animated judicial conceptions of 
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community in that context—has been the problem of community-creation. Judges 
have largely pondered the justifications and limits upon the state’s authority to 
create racial plurality in public schools. Such arguments proceed from background 
assumptions of minimal racial plurality absent the contemplated state actions.   
In contrast, in the religion/ideology and public education context, the major 
cases and judicial arguments on plurality within public schools are preoccupied 
with the problems of community-maintenance. Judges have pondered the 
justifications and limits upon state actions to maintain stable communities in public 
schools in the face of individual claims of religious freedom and competing state 
claims favoring uniformity. In contrast to the racial context, the background 
presumption here is inevitable religious/ideological plurality in public schools, 
even absent the contemplated state actions. This in turn, however, leads to the 
problem of maintenance: we see the judiciary in this context grappling with the 
problem of how best to fashion stable community out of inescapably disparate 
parts.   
Finally, in Part IV, I return to the example of Yale University and offer my 
third and final claim: for community-builders, maintenance problems are easier 
than creation problems. This point, in turn, suggests that while plurality may be 
inevitable, plurality within a communal structure holds greater hope for lines of 
division to be overcome. This is because the culture intrinsic to a community can 
potentially serve as an adhesive across lines of division. Thus, to the extent that 
one finds the goals of community and unity to be worthwhile, this observation 
implies that mechanisms that situate plurality within community are often 
preferable to those that let plurality persist between distinct communities. 
 
II.  CULTURAL COMMONALITY IN PUBLIC SCHOOLS 
 
In this Part and the next, I explore a limited but significant subset of cases that 
deal with racial and religious/ideological differences in American public education. 
More precisely, I focus on cases—which are all Supreme Court cases with one 
notable exception—that are commonly recognized as pivotal in their respective 
doctrinal contexts. In addition, I focus only on those cases where the opinions 
explicitly contemplate and grapple with the problem of plurality and political 
community-building within public schools. Thus, for example, I devote much 
attention to the prominent free exercise case of Mozert v. Hawkins35 below because 
in that case the judges of the Sixth Circuit had to confront a conflict between a 
school district’s choice of curriculum and the religious beliefs of some children 
and their parents.36  
                                                
35 827 F.2d 1058 (6th Cir. 1987). 
36 In contrast, I have very little discussion on some of the pivotal cases in the Court’s 
Establishment Clause jurisprudence regarding state aid to private, religious schools. Such 
cases do intersect with themes of religious plurality and public education, and as such, they 
do figure into some of the scholarly debates discussed in both Parts II and III. Still, these 
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Using some significant cases that fall within the above noted parameters as 
the focal point of our discussion, I will proceed to make a set of claims about how 
the judiciary views the problems and possibilities of political community-building 
in public schools across the racial and religious/ideological contexts. The focus in 
this Part will be on the first claim noted above: judges have seen public schools as 
an adhesive force in American society across racial and religious lines by virtue of 
their role in bringing diverse groups of students into close contact with one 
another—thereby creating a common culture. The test for whether my claims seem 
plausible relies, in part, upon whether my choice of cases can be seen as fairly 
representative of the broader doctrinal themes in both of these contexts. 
 
A.  Race and Public Education: Adhesive Structures 
 
In Brown v. Board of Education,37 Chief Justice Warren’s opinion for the 
Court emphasized the importance of public education with this memorable 
comment: 
 
Today, education is perhaps the most important function of state and 
local governments. Compulsory school attendance laws and the great 
expenditures for education both demonstrate our recognition of the 
importance of education to our democratic society. It is required in the 
performance of our most basic public responsibilities, even service in the 
armed forces. It is the very foundation of good citizenship. Today it is a 
principal instrument in awakening the child to cultural values, in 
preparing him for later professional training, and in helping him to adjust 
normally to his environment. In these days, it is doubtful that any child 
may reasonably be expected to succeed in life if he is denied the 
opportunity of an education.38 
 
Within this passage, Warren mentioned that elementary and secondary schools 
fulfill three key social functions, two of which clearly speak to the role of public 
schools in facilitating a cohesive political community. The first theme was the 
notion of public schools preparing students for citizenship and its future 
responsibilities. The second theme, which may be seen as either a corollary to the 
citizenship theme or an idea somewhat distinct from it, was that schools impart 
                                                
cases depart from our focus in that they deal with religious plurality beyond the confines of 
a public educational institution, and speak to a more systemic plurality. See, e.g., Everson 
v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 18 (1947) (allowing transportation expenses of parents sending 
their children to religious schools to be reimbursed by the state). See generally John C. 
Jeffries, Jr. & James E. Ryan, A Political History of the Establishment Clause, 100 MICH. 
L. REV. 279, 288–89 (2001) (summarizing the history of modern Establishment Clause 
cases). 
37 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
38 Id. at 493. 
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certain core norms and values to students.39 The third theme, which perhaps has 
fewer implications for political community-building, was the notion that schools 
are crucial in aiding the professional training and development of students.40   
Warren was not articulating this view of public education purely in the 
abstract. The background context was the Court’s dismantling of Jim Crow 
segregated schooling. Thus, in order for elementary and secondary public 
educational institutions to serve these functions, racial segregation could not be 
allowed. As Warren stated in a memorable line: “To separate them [African-
American children] from others of similar age and qualifications solely because of 
their race generates a feeling of inferiority as to their status in the community that 
may affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone.”41 Warren’s 
famous conclusion in Brown was that the physical separation of African-American 
and white students in public schools was inherently unequal.42 Unlike its earlier 
rulings in the context of higher public education, the Court made it clear in Brown 
that segregated public educational institutions, even with equal resources, would 
never meet the requirements of the Equal Protection Clause.43 
Much commentary has been written subsequently—and continues to be 
written—on the precise harm the Court meant to rectify in prohibiting segregated 
public schools in Brown. Was Warren’s inclusive vision of public education 
undermined by the legally-mandated nature of racial separation between African-
American and white students? Or was Warren’s vision primarily undermined by 
the fact or existence of racial separation between African-American and white 
students?44   
Regardless of whether de jure or de facto segregation was the primary harm 
that Brown was meant to address, it was quite clear that the actual, stark physical 
separation of African-American and white students was, at the least, a significant 
point of concern for the Brown Court. This, in turn, suggests that the role of public 
schools in imparting or inculcating the duties of citizenship or other core norms 
                                                
39 See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 221 (1982); San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. 
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 113–15 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
40 See Plyler, 457 U.S. at 221–22. 
41 Brown, 347 U.S. at 494. 
42 Id. at 495. 
43 Id. at 491–92, 494–95. The Court had declined to directly overrule Plessy v. 
Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896), and its allowance for segregated education, four years 
prior to Brown in the case of Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629, 635–36 (1950).  In the same 
vein, see also, McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents, 339 U.S. 637, 642 (1950). 
44 To use the terms commonly employed in the literature, some believe Brown stands 
for the prohibition of racial classifications in the law, or an anticlassification principle. 
Others, however, believe Brown stands for a principle of antisubordination: it supports the 
prohibition of laws that function to subordinate racial minorities (regardless of whether 
those laws employ racial classifications or not). STUART L. CHINN, RECALIBRATING 
REFORM: THE LIMITS OF POLITICAL CHANGE 153 (2014). My own view is that both 
principles can be plausibly linked to the Brown ruling. Id. at 176–77. 
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was, to some extent, undermined by a system of schools that physically separated 
white students from minority students. Even if such values could be imparted to 
white and African-American children in “separate but equal” schools, this would 
still be a constitutionally insufficient discharge of the duties of these institutions. 
Implied within Brown then was recognition of the fact that public schools more 
precisely serve a function of educating students within racially pluralistic public 
schools. I would suggest that the function of schools that Warren hints at, if only 
implicitly, is a function of creating common cultural bonds between students of 
different races.   
We see this judicial concern with “plurality in practice,” within the Brown 
Court’s notable—and disappointing for some—discussion of the remedy, where it 
would allow desegregation to take place “with all deliberate speed.”45 Such 
language, and the judicial concerns regarding implementation underlying it,46 
indicated an awareness by the Court that actual, physical integration on a 
significant scale was a desired (eventual) implication of its original ruling in 
Brown. Similarly, in subsequent cases, the Supreme Court emphasized the 
importance of actual integration when it confronted specific instances of school 
districts attempting to desegregate. For example, in Green v. County Board of New 
Kent City,47 the Court unanimously agreed that the school district’s attempt to 
desegregate its public schools through a freedom-of-choice plan was insufficient.48 
As Justice Brennan stated, underscoring the importance of actual integration: “The 
burden on a school board today is to come forward with a plan that promises 
realistically to work, and promises realistically to work now.”49 Brennan was 
responding to a finding that subsequent to the school district’s implementation of 
the freedom-of-choice plan, the statistics on public school attendance had not 
demonstrated much change in terms of racial integration in actual practice.50 Two 
years later in the case of Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenberg Board of Education,51 
the Court unanimously approved a desegregation plan proposed by the federal 
district court that involved a number of actions—including bussing—that aimed to 
encourage actual integration.52   
Contained within these opinions is a view by the Justices of what is required 
for public schools to serve their various social functions—including their adhesive 
functions. For public schools to adequately serve and discharge their goals of 
shaping citizens, imparting core values, and aiding students in their professional 
development, at least some degree of physical interaction between African-
American and white students would be necessary (though the question of how 
                                                
45 Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955) (Brown II). 
46 RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE 742–49 (2004).  
47 391 U.S. 430 (1968).  
48 Id. at 441–42. 
49 Id. at 439. 
50 Id. at 441. 
51 402 U.S. 1 (1971). 
52 Id. at 22, 31. 
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much interaction might be constitutionally required or allowed was a separate one, 
as I discuss below).53   
Consider next what the judiciary has said in the context of race and public 
higher education, where some of the above noted themes recur, but in a different 
form. Here again, the Court has articulated how public educational institutions can 
promote political community through cultural mechanisms. The most prominent of 
these judicial arguments have emphasized “diversity.”54 The underlying 
implication of diversity arguments is that political community can be promoted 
among a racially diverse cohort of students by virtue of an institution bringing 
them together and facilitating their interaction. Consistent with the judicial 
decisions on integration in the context of elementary and secondary schools, 
judicial opinions here hint at a belief that “diversity” in higher education facilitates 
communal cohesion by letting students engage with each other in close physical 
proximity—thereby creating, I would argue, a common culture.  
Justice Powell memorably mentioned diversity in Regents of the University of 
California v. Bakke55 where, in his opinion for a divided Court, he focused on 
“diversity” as a compelling justification for affirmative action sufficient to pass 
constitutional muster under a strict scrutiny/equal protection analysis.56 While also 
rejecting several other potential justifications for affirmative action as not 
compelling,57 Powell stated that diversity did qualify:58 
                                                
53 To be sure, one might critique the preceding argument by questioning whether the 
goals of citizenship, values inculcation, or individual development were viewed by judges 
as inherently connected to the physical exposure of African-American and white students 
to each other—and flowed from the creation of a common culture—or were just incidental 
to that interaction. Indeed, to the latter point, one might argue that the Court’s rulings 
facilitated these benefits of public education for African-Americans not necessarily by the 
mandated physical interaction of African-American and white students with each other, but 
rather by allowing African-American students access to the better quality of education that 
existed in predominately or uniformly white schools. That is, the Court’s preoccupation 
with integration was perhaps seen by the Justices as more instrumental rather than as a 
desirable end in itself. Perhaps this is true, though if we take the above noted quotation by 
Warren at face value, his Brown opinion suggests otherwise. 
54 See infra pp. 27–30.  
55 438 U.S. 265 (1978). 
56 Id. at 314–15. 
57 Id. at 305–11 (1978). The four justifications for affirmative action the Court 
considered were: 
 
(i) “reducing the historic deficit of traditionally disfavored minorities in medical 
schools and in the medical profession”; (ii) countering the effects of societal 
discrimination; (iii) increasing the number of physicians who will practice in 
communities currently underserved; and (iv) obtaining the educational benefits 
that flow from an ethnically diverse student body. It is necessary to decide 
which, if any, of these purposes is substantial enough to support the use of a 
suspect classification. Id. at 306 (citations omitted). 
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The atmosphere of “speculation, experiment and creation”—so essential 
to the quality of higher education—is widely believed to be promoted by 
a diverse student body. As the Court noted in Keyishian, it is not too 
much to say that the “nation’s future depends upon leaders trained 
through wide exposure” to the ideas and mores of students as diverse as 
this Nation of many peoples.59 
 
Justice O’Connor further elaborated on the diversity rationale in writing for a 
five-vote majority in Grutter v. Bollinger,60 where the Court upheld the Michigan 
Law School’s affirmative action program.61 O’Connor reaffirmed the diversity 
goal as a justification for affirmative action.62 She likewise spoke to how diversity 
in public higher education could both aid the professional development of students 
exposed to it and contribute to the creation of a national political community by 
facilitating a more inclusive national culture. As O’Connor stated:   
 
These benefits are substantial. As the District Court emphasized, the Law 
School’s admissions policy promotes “cross-racial understanding,” helps 
to break down racial stereotypes, and “enables [students] to better 
understand persons of different races.” These benefits are “important and 
laudable,” because “classroom discussion is livelier, more spirited, and 
simply more enlightening and interesting” when the students have “the 
greatest possible variety of backgrounds.” 
 
The Law School’s claim of a compelling interest is further bolstered by 
its amici, who point to the educational benefits that flow from student 
body diversity. In addition to the expert studies and reports entered into 
evidence at trial, numerous studies show that student body diversity 
promotes learning outcomes, and “better prepares students for an 
increasingly diverse workforce and society, and better prepares them as 
professionals.”63  
 
On the preceding point, O’Connor emphasized the strong support for affirmative 
action from representatives of these various sectors of scoiety that was registered 
in amicus briefs. These sources attested to the tangible benefits they saw from the 
promotion of racial diversity: 
 
                                                
58 Id. at 314–15. 
59 Id. at 312–13 (quoting Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967)). 
60 539 U.S. 306 (2003). 
61 Id. at 343–44. 
62 Id. at 325, 328. 
63 Id. at 330 (citations omitted). 
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These benefits are not theoretical but real, as major American businesses 
have made clear that the skills needed in today’s increasingly global 
marketplace can only be developed through exposure to widely diverse 
people, cultures, ideas, and viewpoints. What is more, high-ranking 
retired officers and civilian leaders of the United States military assert 
that, “based on their decades of experience,” a “highly qualified, racially 
diverse officer corps . . . is essential to the military’s ability to fulfill its 
principle mission to provide national security.” . . . To fulfill its mission, 
the military “must be selective in admissions for training and education 
for the officer corps, and it must train and educate a highly qualified, 
racially diverse officer corps in a racially diverse setting.” We agree that 
“it requires only a small step from this analysis to conclude that our 
country’s other most selective institutions must remain both diverse and 
selective.”64 
 
Finally, beyond the benefits of diversity for the students exposed to it, and for 
future employers and coworkers of these students, O’Connor voiced one other 
benefit: the symbolic legitimacy that higher education diversity provided for elite 
sectors of American society.65 The physical proximity of a more racially diverse 
cast of future leaders in these higher educational institutions carried cohesive 
benefits that were systemic: 
 
In order to cultivate a set of leaders with legitimacy in the eyes of the 
citizenry, it is necessary that the path to leadership be visibly open to 
talented and qualified individuals of every race and ethnicity. All 
members of our heterogeneous society must have confidence in the 
openness and integrity of the educational institutions that provide this 
training. As we have recognized, law schools “cannot be effective in 
isolation from the individuals and institutions with which the law 
interacts.” Access to legal education (and thus the legal profession) must 
be inclusive of talented and qualified individuals of every race and 
ethnicity, so that all members of our heterogeneous society may 
participate in the educational institutions that provide the training and 
education necessary to succeed in America.66 
 
Thus, much like the Court’s earlier cases on elementary and secondary 
education, the diversity rationale in the context of higher education affirmative 
action sets forth a judicial belief that benefits flow from the physical interaction 
between students of different races. To be sure, some of what the Justices refer to 
                                                
64 Id. at 330–31 (citations omitted). O’Connor also nods to a defense of affirmative 
action because of its benefits to citizenship development. Id. at 331–32. 
65 Id. at 332–33.  
66 Id. (citation omitted). 
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in the above quotations are benefits to student professional development stemming 
from this exposure to diversity.67 But also present in these comments are some 
benefits of diversity that are less narrowly instrumental: building “cross-racial 
understanding,” building empathy, and, ultimately, discovering similarities with 
other students and cultivating shared experiences. By emphasizing the significance 
of physical interaction across diverse students, these judicial arguments ultimately 
endorse a view of communal cohesiveness premised upon cultural bonds. 
 
B.  Race and Public Education: Limits 
 
If the preceding cases all contain statements on the adhesive benefits of 
facilitating diverse racial communities within public schools, judges have also 
offered a number of statements that have clarified some limits upon this 
community-building function. For one thing, as noted above, race-based 
affirmative action is not constitutionally required.68 But beyond this preliminary 
point, at least two key limits have emerged in the doctrine spelling out judicial 
beliefs on how the goals of integration and diversity must be qualified in the face 
of competing rights and institutions. 
The first qualification is tied to the Court’s ruling in Milliken v. Bradley69 in 
1974, where the Court emphasized one crucial limit upon its vision of integrated 
schooling: its aversion to racial balancing (or racial quotas) as a goal in itself.70 In 
making the point, the Court established the requirement of prior intentional 
discrimination by the state before aggressive desegregation remedies, like 
interschool district bussing, could be employed.71 In this case, the federal district 
court had set forth an interschool district desegregation remedy in response to a 
problem of de jure segregation in the Detroit city schools. The proposed remedy 
would bus African-American students to surrounding Detroit suburbs—and bus 
white students from those suburbs into the Detroit city schools—in order to 
achieve better racial balances (due to the fact that there simply were not enough 
white students left in the Detroit city school district to allow for a Detroit-only 
remedy).72 The Supreme Court ruled against this remedy.73 Justice Burger wrote 
for the Court and clarified that he saw racial integration as a constitutionally 
required goal only when pursued as a targeted response to prior, clearly defined 
                                                
67 Notably, however, O’Connor does briefly discuss and notes some key race and 
elementary/secondary education cases in mentioning the citizenship and norms-inculcating 
functions of public schools. Id. at 331–32. 
68 The Court has not found higher education affirmative action programs to be 
constitutionally required. See, e.g., Schuette v. BAMN, 134 S.Ct. 1623, 1627 (2014) 
(describing earlier holdings). 
69 418 U.S. 717 (1974). 
70 Id. at 749. 
71 Id. at 744–45. 
72 Id. at 725–36. 
73 Id. at 752–53. 
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state acts of intentional segregation.74 The judicial pursuit of racial balancing for its 
own sake, absent prior state discriminatory acts, was deemed unconstitutional.75 
The Milliken Court’s stated aversion to racial balancing and racial quotas 
would be a much-emphasized theme in subsequent affirmative action cases as well. 
For example, Powell in Bakke noted that the U.C. Davis medical school program at 
issue in that case was a preferential racial quota, and emphasized this as a reason 
for why it fell short of constitutional requirements.76 Likewise, O’Connor’s 
opinion in Grutter emphasized that the Michigan Law School’s affirmative action 
program was not a racial quota in ultimately concluding that it passed 
constitutional muster.77 
This aversion to racial quotas and the requirement of prior discrimination for 
integrationist remedies suggests, in a broader sense, a crucial doctrinal limitation 
upon any judicial commitment to political community-building across racial lines 
in public schools. These cases suggest a judicial aversion to political community-
building with too much of an emphasis on racial identity. Underscoring the point, 
O’Connor offered a notable comment on this in the non education-related voting 
rights case of Shaw v. Reno,78 where she stated: 
 
Racial classifications of any sort pose the risk of lasting harm to our 
society. They reinforce the belief, held by too many for too much of our 
history, that individuals should be judged by the color of their skin. 
Racial classifications with respect to voting carry particular dangers. 
Racial gerrymandering, even for remedial purposes, may balkanize us 
into competing racial factions; it threatens to carry us further from the 
goal of a political system in which race no longer matters—a goal that 
the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments embody, and to which the 
Nation continues to aspire. It is for these reasons that race-based 
districting by our state legislatures demands close judicial scrutiny.79 
 
Accordingly, in her Grutter opinion, O’Connor offered the following concluding 
comment qualifying her ruling: 
 
It has been 25 years since Justice Powell first approved the use of race to 
further an interest in student body diversity in the context of public 
higher education. Since that time, the number of minority applicants with 
high grades and test scores has indeed increased. We expect that 25 years 
                                                
74 Id. at 744–46. 
75 Id. at 740–41, 749. 
76 Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 315–20 (1978). 
77 Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 334–39 (2003). This conclusion had also been 
reached in the prior case of Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenberg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 28, 
32 (1971), and repeated in Bakke, 438 U.S. at 307. 
78 509 U.S. 630 (1993). 
79 Id. at 657. 
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from now, the use of racial preferences will no longer be necessary to 
further the interest approved today.80 
 
Similarly, in his opinion for the Court in Parents Involved in Community Schools 
v. Seattle School District No. 1,81 Justice Roberts was even more pointed on this 
concern in striking down certain types of student assignment plans that were based 
in part upon the race of students: 
 
Before Brown, schoolchildren were told where they could and could not 
go to school based on the color of their skin. The school districts in these 
cases have not carried the heavy burden of demonstrating that we should 
allow this once again—even for very different reasons. For schools that 
never segregated on the basis of race, such as Seattle, or that have 
removed the vestiges of past segregation, such as Jefferson County, the 
way “to achieve a system of determining admission to the public schools 
on a nonracial basis,” is to stop assigning students on a racial basis. The 
way to stop discrimination on the basis of race is to stop discriminating 
on the basis of race.82 
 
Beyond its aversion to racial balancing absent prior acts of discrimination, a 
second limit can be discerned in the doctrine upon state efforts to build racially 
pluralistic communities in public schools: from judicial reticenses to preserving 
local governmental authority over elementary and secondary education. For 
example, as previously noted, the Court opposed the inter-district remedy at issue 
in Milliken.83 Relevant to its analysis, and pressing against the proposed remedy, 
was the Court’s acknowledgment of the limits of judicial power.84 Relatedly, it 
also acknowledged the importance of deferring to local governmental authority in 
the context of elementary and secondary education: 
 
No single tradition in public education is more deeply rooted than local 
control over the operation of schools; local autonomy has long been 
thought essential both to the maintenance of community concern and 
support for public schools and to quality of the educational 
process. Thus, in San Antonio School District v. Rodriguez, we observed 
that local control over the educational process affords citizens an 
opportunity to participate in decisionmaking, permits the structuring of 
                                                
80 Grutter, 539 U.S. at 343. 
81 551 U.S. 701 (2007).  
82 Id. at 730–33, 747–48, 759 (Thomas, J., concurring) (citations omitted); id. at 797–
98 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). 
83 Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 751–53 (1974).  
84 Id. at 742. 
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school programs to fit local needs, and encourages “experimentation, 
innovation, and a healthy competition for educational excellence.” 
 
The Michigan educational structure involved in this case, in common 
with most States, provides for a large measure of local control, and a 
review of the scope and character of these local powers indicates the 
extent to which the interdistrict remedy approved by the two courts could 
disrupt and alter the structure of public education in Michigan.85 
 
In sum then, the judicial vision of political community that emerges from 
these several cases on race and public education certainly acknowledges the appeal 
of racial diversity in schools. Common to both the public elementary/secondary 
educational context and the public higher educational context, there is a judicial 
recognition of how the physical exposure of students to those of different races 
carries a number of benefits—some of which encompass adhesive, cultural 
benefits in facilitating community both within the school itself and broader society. 
Yet, this vision of racial diversity is qualified by judicial anxieties about racial 
quotas, and by a judicial fear of its own institutional overreach. 
 
C.  Religion/Ideology and Public Schools: Adhesive Structures 
 
In some ways, the Court’s rulings on public education in the context of 
religion and ideological conflict are even more explicit in identifying the social 
functions fulfilled by schools.86 First, in line with Warren’s comments in Brown, 
the Court has emphasized the importance of public schools in shaping future 
citizens.87 Specifically, the Court has noted that one of the functions of public 
schools is imparting and instilling certain core values that are needed for good 
citizenship and the maintenance of the American polity.88 Consider, for example, 
this comment by the Court in the case of Ambach v. Norwick:89 
 
Other authorities have perceived public schools as an “assimilative 
force” by which diverse and conflicting elements in our society are 
brought together on a broad but common ground. These perceptions of 
the public schools as inculcating fundamental values necessary to the 
maintenance of a democratic political system have been confirmed by the 
observations of social scientists. 
                                                
85 Id. at 741–43 (citations omitted). See also San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist., v. 
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 49–50 (1973). 
86 See Suzanna Sherry, Responsible Republicanism: Educating for Citizenship, 62 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 131, 188 n.239 (1995), though I categorize these functions somewhat 
differently than she does. 
87 See Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 77–78 (1979). 
88 Id.  
89 Id.  
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Within the public school system, teachers play a critical part in 
developing students’ attitude toward government and understanding of 
the role of citizens in our society.90 
 
Second, and related to the preceding point, certain values have been 
emphasized by the Court as crucial to either good citizenship or to the maintenance 
of the polity. Two of these values have been toleration and critical thinking. While 
the Court has emphasized toleration and critical thinking in different contexts, the 
two concepts have also overlapped in the Court’s opinions.91   
In a similar vein, the Court has likewise emphasized the importance of state 
neutrality (between religions, or between religion and nonreligion) and related 
concepts in its Establishment Clause cases dealing with public education.92 Though 
somewhat less articulate in clarifying the array of goals and purposes that public 
education is meant to pursue (compared to some of the other cases discussed in 
more detail below), these Establishment Clause cases also contain an implicit 
vision of political community and public education. Ultimately, what ties all of 
these values together—toleration, critical thinking, and state neutrality with regard 
to religion—is their common opposition to religious fundamentalism. These cases 
all recognize in varying degrees and in different ways the potentially destabilizing 
force of fundamentalism upon the cohesiveness of a pluralistic political 
                                                
90 Id. (citations omitted); see also Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 
681 (1986); Bd. of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 864 (1982); Ambach, 441 U.S. at 76–80; 
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 221, 233 (1972); W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 
319 U.S. 624, 637 (1943); Minersville v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 595–600 (1940). 
91 See, e.g., this comment by Brennan in the higher-education case of Keyishian v. 
Board of Regents: 
 
“The vigilant protection of constitutional freedoms is nowhere more vital than in 
the community of American schools.” The classroom is peculiarly the 
“marketplace of ideas.” The Nation’s future depends upon leaders trained 
through wide exposure to that robust exchange of ideas which discovers truth 
“out of a multitude of tongues, [rather] than through any kind of authoritative 
selection.” 
 
Keyishian, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967) (citations omitted); see also Fraser, 478 U.S. at 681–
83 (1986); Pico, 457 U.S. at 868 (1982); Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 
393 U.S. 503, 511–13 (1969); McCollum v. Bd. of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 216–17 (1948) 
(Frankfurter, J., concurring); Barnette, 319 U.S. at 637 (1943); Mozert v. Hawkins, 827 
F.2d 1058, 1068 (6th Cir. 1987). 
92 See Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 587–88, 592–97 (1992); Edwards v. Aguillard, 
482 U.S. 578, 593 (1987); Wallace v. Jeffree, 472 U.S. 38, 55–56 (1985); Epperson v. 
Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104, 106–09 (1968); Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 
203, 222, 225 (1963); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 431–32 (1961); McCollum, 333 U.S. 
at 210–12 (1948); see also Jeffries & Ryan, supra note 36, at 290.   
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community—whether that fundamentalism may emerge from the state or portions 
of the citizenry. 
Third, and related to the preceding point on values, some judicial opinions 
have also lumped “good character” or character molding as another component of 
the values that public schools impart to students. For example, in the case of Bethel 
School District No. 403 v. Fraser,93 the Court stated:  
 
The process of educating our youth for citizenship in public schools is 
not confined to books, the curriculum, and the civics class; schools must 
teach by example the shared values of a civilized social order. 
Consciously or otherwise, teachers—and indeed the older students—
demonstrate the appropriate form of civil discourse and political 
expression by their conduct and deportment in and out of class. 
Inescapably, like parents, they are role models.94 
 
Finally, and in line with Warren’s opinion in Brown, the Court has also 
emphasized the importance of public schools in aiding the development of students 
toward becoming economically self-sufficient adults in the religion/ideology 
cases.95   
Much like the cases dealing with racial plurality and public education, the 
judiciary has likewise noted with approval the cohesive force of public schools in 
overcoming religious/ideological plurality toward building political community. 
Once again, the roots of this cohesiveness must be understood as cultural, because 
underlying this community-building vision of public schools is the judicial 
contemplation of religious/ideological plurality existing within the public school. If 
there are to be common bonds across religious/ideological difference, the 
“assimilative force” of public schools does not merely reside in the values taught. 
Rather the opinions implicitly presume that the cohesive force of public schools 
stems in part from those values being taught, observed, and applied within a 
religiously/ideologically diverse context. Community flows from the actual 
practice of certain norms within diverse public schools.  
By way of illustrating these points more concretely, let me discuss the case of 
Mozert v. Hawkins96 in greater detail. Mozert, while not a Supreme Court case, 
may be fairly taken as representative of some of the core themes and questions that 
underlie the topic of religious/ideological plurality in public schools. Accordingly, 
as discussed more in Part IV, it has garnered outsized attention in the scholarly 
literature on religious freedom and public schools. 
In Mozert, a group of Christian parents in Hawkins County, Tennessee, raised 
a religious free exercise claim in opposition to some mandatory class reading 
                                                
93 478 U.S. 675 (1986). 
94 Id. at 683; see also Yoder, 406 U.S. at 233 (1972). 
95 Yoder, 406 U.S. at 221. 
96 827 F.2d 1058 (6th Cir. 1987). 
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materials in the public school’s curriculum.97 The adopted materials employed a 
variety of stories, and the objecting parents claimed that elements of these stories 
were objectionable to the religious faith they were trying to instill in their 
children.98 The parents claimed that because the material in these readers 
undermined their religious faith, the religious beliefs of the students (their 
children) were violated, and the religious beliefs of the parents would also be 
violated if they permitted their children to read these books.99 As to what precisely 
was objectionable to the religious beliefs of the parents, Judge Lively stated the 
following in his opinion for the court regarding Vicki Frost, the most visible 
member of the plaintiff-parents: 
 
Mrs. Frost testified that the word of God as found in the Christian Bible 
“is the totality of my beliefs.” There was evidence that other members of 
their churches, and even their pastors, do not agree with their position in 
this case. 
Mrs. Frost testified that she had spent more than 200 hours 
reviewing the Holt series and had found numerous passages that 
offended her religious beliefs. She stated that the offending materials fell 
into seventeen categories which she listed. These ranged from such 
familiar concerns of fundamentalist Christians as evolution and “secular 
humanism” to less familiar themes such as “futuristic supernaturalism,” 
pacifism, magic and false views of death. 
In her lengthy testimony Mrs. Frost identified passages from stories 
and poems used in the Holt series that fell into each category. Illustrative 
is her first category, futuristic supernaturalism, which she defined as 
teaching “Man As God.” Passages that she found offensive described 
Leonardo da Vinci as the human with a creative mind that “came closest 
to the divine touch.” Similarly, she felt that a passage entitled “Seeing 
Beneath the Surface” related to an occult theme, by describing the use of 
imagination as a vehicle for seeing things not discernible through our 
physical eyes. She interpreted a poem, “Look at Anything,” as presenting 
the idea that by using imagination a child can become part of anything 
and thus understand it better. Mrs. Frost testified that it is an “occult 
practice” for children to use imagination beyond the limitation of 
scriptural authority.100 
 
                                                
97 Id. at 1059–60.  
98 Id.  
99 Id at 1060–61. 
100 Id. at 1061–62; see generally STEPHEN BATES, BATTLEGROUND: ONE MOTHER’S 
CRUSADE, THE RELIGIOUS RIGHT, AND THE STRUGGLE FOR CONTROL OF OUR CLASSROOMS 
(1993) (providing background coverage of the litigation in Mozert).  
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Notably, the parents were not demanding a remedy of having the course readers 
removed for all students and having the schools adopt course readers that aligned 
with the dissenting parents’ faith.101 As Judge Lively and Judge Boggs noted in 
their respective opinions, such a remedy would have run afoul of the Establishment 
Clause.102 Rather, the parents demanded the option for their children to opt out of 
class when the readers were being studied and to receive alternative instruction 
from nonobjectionable readers.103 Indeed, this is the type of remedy that the district 
court mentioned in ruling for the plaintiff-parents.104 
The Sixth Circuit, however, ultimately disagreed with the plaintiff-parents, 
and while all three judges on the panel converged on the same result, they had 
some divergence in their preferred rationales.105 Lively, writing for the court, 
argued that the mere exposure of the children to the ideas in the reader could not 
constitute a burden on their religion since the children were not asked to agree with 
or otherwise affirm their belief in the ideas purported to be in the reader: 
 
The requirement that students read the assigned materials and attend 
reading classes, in the absence of a showing that this participation 
entailed affirmation or denial of a religious belief, or performance or 
non-performance of a religious exercise or practice, does not place an 
unconstitutional burden on the students’ free exercise of religion.106 
 
Given this, and given the crucial role of the school in exposing these children—and 
all children—to norms of toleration for others’ religious beliefs,107 Lively 
concluded that the plaintiff-parents lost on their claim, and thus were not entitled to 
the benefit of an opt-out for their children.108 
Judge Kennedy concurred in the ruling and took an even stronger position in 
defense of the school district.109 Kennedy agreed that there was no religious burden 
being imposed on the dissenting parents and their children here.110 Still, she went 
on to argue that even if there were a religious burden in this case, the state should 
still win given that it had compelling interests at stake: its interests in teaching the 
children critical thinking and civility, and avoiding religious divisiveness.111 
Kennedy thus offered the strongest opinion among the three judges on the role of 
the public schools in facilitating cohesion across religious difference. Finally, 
                                                
101 Mozert, 827 F.2d at 1064. 
102 Id. at 1074 (Boggs, J., concurring). 
103 BATES, supra note 100, at 37. 
104 Mozert, 827 F.2d at 1063. 
105 Id. at 1070–81 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (Boggs, J., concurring). 
106 Id. at 1065. 
107 Id. at 1069. 
108 Id. at 1068–70. 
109 Id. at 1070–73 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
110 Id. at 1070. 
111 Id. at 1070–73 (Kennedy, J., concurring).  
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Judge Boggs concurred in the result, but reached this conclusion through quite a 
different route compared to the other two judges.112 He thought that there was a 
kind of religious “burden” imposed on the dissenting parents and their children, 
and that the exposure of these children to certain ideas was not insignificant but 
instead the imposition of a genuine cost to them: 
 
The plaintiffs provided voluminous testimony of the conflict (in their 
view) between reading the Holt readers and their religious beliefs, 
including extensive Scriptural references. The district court found that 
“plaintiffs’ religious beliefs compel them to refrain from exposure to the 
Holt series.” I would think it could hardly be clearer that they believe 
their religion commands, not merely suggests, their course of action.113 
 
That said, he also thought that the burden suffered by the plaintiffs did not 
constitute a constitutional burden.114 Boggs instead ruled for the school district 
based upon his strong presumption of judicial deference to local school boards on 
such decisions of curriculum; ultimately, this was an argument based on 
democratic and local grounds. As he stated: 
 
It is a substantial imposition on the schools to require them to justify 
each instance of not dealing with students’ individual, religiously 
compelled, objections (as opposed to permitting a local, rough and ready, 
adjustment), and I do not see that the Supreme Court has authorized us to 
make such a requirement.115 
 
D.  Religion/Ideology and Public Schools: Limits 
 
All three of the Sixth Circuit judges involved in Mozert, in their own ways, 
nodded to or offered their approval of public schools serving a cohesive function in 
the face of religious/ideological plurality.116 Boggs’ opinion offered the least 
support for this view, but even he, in the end, ruled in favor of Hawkins County 
and in favor of the authority of local communities to shape their public school 
curricula as they saw fit.117 If he was not as sympathetic as Kennedy to the notion 
of a compelling state interest in teaching children critical thinking, he was 
                                                
112 Id. at 1075–80 (Boggs, J., concurring) (arguing that this decision would impose a 
“religious burden” on certain students, but rather than dissenting in the opinion, would 
rather defer to the Supreme Court). 
113 Id. at 1076. 
114 Id. at 1079. 
115 Id. at 1080 (citations omitted). 
116 See generally id. (offering their approval of the function of public schools and 
their role in providing a unifying function in settings with a diversity of religious and 
ideological beliefs). 
117 Id. at 1079–81 (Boggs, J., concurring).  
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sympathetic to the choice of Hawkins County to emphasize critical thinking in its 
curriculum.   
Yet, consider two significant limitations upon the authority of the state to 
build religiously pluralistic communities in public schools, as recognized in the 
doctrine. The first lies at the heart of the plaintiff-parents’ claims in Mozert: the 
religious free exercise of students and their parents.118 Though the plaintiff-parents 
were ultimately unsuccessful in Mozert, such claims were present in another major 
religious freedom case where a group of dissenting parents of school children 
found elements of the state’s vision of public education to be in conflict with their 
beliefs.119 In contrast to the parents in Mozert, however, these parents actually 
prevailed on their claims, and individual religious freedom ultimately trumped the 
demands of the state.120  
In Wisconsin v. Yoder,121 the Supreme Court confronted a group of dissenting 
parents making a free exercise claim against Wisconsin’s mandatory school 
attendance law, which required children to attend private or public school until the 
age of sixteen.122 These parents were Amish and had declined to have their 
children attend public school after the eighth grade.123 They claimed that the 
exposure of their children to public school after the eighth grade threatened their 
salvation, their good standing in the religious community, the salvation of their 
children, and, ultimately, threatened the survival of their religious community.124 
The Court sided with the parents, emphasizing in part the distinctiveness of 
the Amish community: 
 
The record shows that the respondents’ religious beliefs and attitude 
toward life, family, and home have remained constant—perhaps some 
would say static—in a period of unparalleled progress in human 
knowledge generally and great changes in education. The respondents 
freely concede, and indeed assert as an article of faith, that their religious 
beliefs and what we would today call “life style” have not altered in 
fundamentals for centuries. Their way of life in a church-oriented 
community, separated from the outside world and “worldly” influences, 
their attachment to nature and the soil, is a way inherently simple and 
uncomplicated, albeit difficult to preserve against the pressure to 
conform. Their rejection of telephones, automobiles, radios, and 
television, their mode of dress, of speech, their habits of manual work do 
                                                
118 Id. at 1060–61. 
119 Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 207–09 (1972).  
120 Id. at 234 (“[T]he First and Fourteenth Amendments prevent the State from 
compelling respondents to cause their children to attend formal high school to age 16.”). 
121 Id. 
122 Id. at 207. 
123 See id.  
124 See id. at 209–12. 
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indeed set them apart from much of contemporary society; these customs 
are both symbolic and practical.125 
 
Indeed, the distinctiveness of the Amish community was a point made by Lively in 
distinguishing the parents in the Mozert case from the parents involved in Yoder.126   
Very closely related to the preceding point, a second doctrinal limitation to 
the judicial sympathy for community-building in schools in the 
religious/ideological context has been the doctrine’s very established protection of 
certain parental rights to control the education of their children—including the 
preservation of a private school option.127 The Court’s allowance for private 
schools thus permits an opt-out for those parents dissatisfied with public school 
institutions, and who possess the means to pay private school tuition. Pierce v. 
Society of the Sisters128 was the pivotal case in this regard, where the Court struck 
down an Oregon state law that sought to ban private school instruction for children 
between the ages of eight and sixteen (i.e., it required their attendance in public 
schools).129 Two years earlier, in Meyer v. Nebraska,130 the Court likewise struck 
down a Nebraska state law that sought to prohibit foreign language instruction 
prior to the eighth grade, in any private or public school.131  
These two cases stand out in the development of substantive due process and 
as strong statements of judicial sympathy for parental authority over the education 
of their children—a theme also discussed in Yoder.132 But the upshot of these cases 
for our purposes is that they indicate clear limits upon a judicial vision 
emphasizing the adhesive force of public education; in essence, the preservation of 
a private school option allows children and their parents the potential to opt out of 
the plurality and values being inculcated in elementary and secondary public 
schools. Elements of these parental rights norms also underlie, to some extent, the 
Court’s Establishment Clause cases dealing with the constitutionally permissible 
limits of state aid to religious schools.133 And in more recent years, these same 
norms have been implicated in the legal debates over school choice and 
homeschooling options.134 
                                                
125 Id. at 216–17, 235–36.  
126 The following is Lively’s comment on Yoder: “However, Yoder rested on such a 
singular set of facts that we do not believe it can be held to announce a general rule that 
exposure without compulsion to act, believe, affirm or deny creates an unconstitutional 
burden.” Mozert v. Hawkins, 827 F.2d 1058, 1067 (6th Cir. 1987).  
127 See id. 
128 268 U.S. 510 (1925). 
129 Id. at 535–36. 
130 262 U.S. 390 (1923). 
131 Id. at 403. 
132 See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 213–14, 231–34 (1972). 
133 See Jeffries & Ryan, supra note 36, at 288–89.   
134 See infra Part III. 
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In sum, though the specific doctrinal limits may be different in the racial and 
religious/ideological contexts, a basic similarity emerges in the Court’s approach 
to both forms of plurality in public schools: a recognition of the beneficial 
cohesive function served by public schools in cultivating elements of a common 
culture, and a recognition of certain limits upon this cohesive function.135 
 
III.  CREATION AND MAINTENANCE OF POLITICAL COMMUNITY  
IN PUBLIC SCHOOLS 
 
Pivotal cases I cite in the preceding Part—such as Brown, Milliken, Grutter, 
Gobitis, Barnette, Yoder, and Mozert—each command outsized attention within 
their respective doctrinal areas. Part of the significance of these cases stems from 
the specific rulings reached by their respective Courts. Relatedly, their significance 
also stems from the broader social and legal problems presented within these cases 
as well. With Brown and Milliken, for example, we have the two notable bookends 
to the Court’s mid-twentieth century effort to desegregate elementary and 
secondary public schools. In Grutter, we have the Court’s most recent, definitive 
statement on higher educational race-based affirmative action, which is perhaps the 
most visible, remaining controversy left over from the civil rights era.136 And in 
Gobitis, Barnette, Yoder, and Mozert we have a set of cases—spanning decades—
that illustrate the multifaceted tension between individual religious freedom and 
the authority of the state in structuring public education. 
That these different issues—school desegregation, affirmative action, 
religious freedom—have figured so prominently in the respective doctrinal areas of 
race and religion/ideology in public education points to a notable divergence in the 
very manner in which the judiciary has conceptualized political community in 
these two contexts. Specifically, the fact that school integration and affirmative 
action have been so central to the race and public education context suggests that 
the problems of political community-creation have been central to the judicial 
considerations and arguments there. Hence, there is a judicial focus in those cases 
                                                
135 Recall that in the race context, the Court recognized the significance of local 
governmental control as a limitation upon state efforts at community-building across racial 
lines. That is, local governmental control was seen as a force that facilitated segmentation. 
The importance of local governmental control also appears in the religion context, though 
in a different posture. In the latter context, local governmental actions have typically 
appeared in the case law as promoting uniformity in a school community. Hence, far from 
being a check on state actions encouraging community-building and uniformity, any 
judicial anxieties about local governmental control in the religious context center on how 
they may encourage a repressive uniformity. See Minersville Sch. Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 
586, 596–600 (1940) overruled by W. Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943); 
W. Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 647–53, 665–71 (1953) (Frankfurter, J., 
dissenting); Tyll van Geel, Citizenship Education and the Free Exercise of Religion, 34 
AKRON L. REV. 293, 301–03 (2000).  
136 See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 343 (2003). 
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on the scope and limits of state power in creating new racially integrated public 
school communities through aggressive desegregation remedies at the elementary 
and secondary level, or through race-based affirmative action at the higher 
education level.  
In contrast, the controversies over state authority to control student behavior, 
control the curriculum, and compel attendance in public schools in the face of 
religious/ideological plurality suggests a relatively greater judicial preoccupation 
with political community-maintenance in those cases. That is, unlike the racial 
context, there is a built-in judicial presumption of religious/ideological plurality 
existing in public schools.137 As the judges have conceptualized it, the problem 
confronting those who wish to build political community across 
religious/ideological lines in public schools is not how to bring about pluralistic 
communities, but how best to manage an already existing plurality—or how best to 
maintain political community. 
In the sections below, I will proceed by fleshing out the relatively greater 
judicial focus on creation in the racial context, and maintenance in the 
religious/ideological context. Similar to Part II, the discussion of these doctrinal 
areas will not be comprehensive, but will instead focus on those cases that have 
figured prominently in questions of racial or religious/ideological plurality in 
public schools. The test of whether or not my case selection is representative of the 
various, primary concerns in these doctrinal areas will, as in Part II, rest upon the 
plausibility of my claims. 
Yet, unlike the upshot of Part II where I highlighted similarities in the judicial 
arguments on racial and religious/ideological plurality in public schools, this Part 
will be focused on the above noted divergence. Specifically, I will aim to 
illuminate this distinction between a judicial focus on creation in the racial context 
and maintenance in the religious/ideological context by elaborating upon the 
various concerns articulated by proponents of community-building (who I will 
refer to as “community-advocates”) and those more skeptical of community-
building actions by the state (who I will refer to as “skeptics”) in each body of 
doctrine.138 Illuminating these concerns in more detail will underscore the 
                                                
137 See George W. Dent, Jr., Religious Children, Secular Schools, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 
871–73 (1988).  
138 I should mention two notes about my choice of terminology here. First, I use the 
term “community-advocates” instead of “communitarianism,” simply because the latter has 
too much conceptual baggage from debates in political theory, some of which are not 
relevant to my concerns here. For a brief and concise summary of the various claims of 
communitarian political theorists, see WILL KYMLICKA, CONTEMPORARY POLITICAL 
PHILOSOPHY: AN INTRODUCTION 199–237 (2002). Second, my labels of “community-
advocate” and “skeptic” are intended only to mark out distinct positions on specific issues. 
Thus, when I label Justice Jackson’s opinion in West Virginia State Board of Education vs. 
Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) as a “skeptical” argument on community below, this is not 
to imply an evaluation of Jackson’s larger philosophy on political community. It is merely 
to indicate that on the particular issue of the mandatory flag salute, at issue in that case, 
 
566 UTAH LAW REVIEW [NO. 3 
divergent background presumptions behind them—namely, that in the racial 
context, a pluralistic community is not presumed in our public schools, while in the 
religious/ideological context, such a community is presumed. 
 
A.  Race and Community-Creation in Public Schools 
 
Among those judges and scholars who have favored facilitating more racially 
diverse communities in public schools, one persistent concern has been the 
pernicious effect of enduring racial isolation and segmentation in the absence of 
aggressive desegregation remedies at the elementary and secondary level, or 
affirmative action at the higher education level. The judicial posture among those 
seeking to facilitate racial plurality is one of community-creation, because absent 
judicial approval of the state actions involved—desegregation measures or higher 
education affirmative action—the background presumption is that there would be 
minimal racial plurality occurring in public educational institutions. 
Consider in this regard some of the dissents in the Milliken opinion. In 
evaluating the majority’s disapproval of the city-suburban desegregation remedy, 
Justice Douglas stated the following on the background condition of residential 
segregation in Detroit: 
 
The inner core of Detroit is now rather solidly black; and the blacks, 
we know, in many instances are likely to be poorer, just as were the 
Chicanos in San Antonio School District v. Rodriguez. By that decision 
the poorer school districts must pay their own way. It is therefore a 
foregone conclusion that we have now given the States a formula 
whereby the poor must pay their own way. 139 
 
Similarly, Justice Marshall stated the following: 
 
Under a Detroit-only decree, Detroit’s schools will clearly remain 
racially identifiable in comparison with neighboring schools in the 
metropolitan community. Schools with 65% and more Negro students 
will stand in sharp and obvious contrast to schools in neighboring 
districts with less than 2% Negro enrollment. Negro students will 
continue to perceive their schools as segregated educational facilities and 
                                                
Justice Jackson’s opinion relative to Justice Frankfurter’s was the position more skeptical 
of or relatively less concerned with, facilitating community-building in public schools. 
139 Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 759–60 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting) 
(citations omitted). 
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this perception will only be increased when whites react to a Detroit-only 
decree by fleeing to the suburbs to avoid integration.140 
 
There is no mistaking the background presumption—at least among these 
dissenting Justices—that the default status quo condition in Detroit is one of 
minimal racial plurality in these public schools. And in the post-Brown era, the 
absence of greater integration in public schools underscores the strong suspicion 
that the default societal condition—absent integrationist measures by the state 
during and since the civil rights era—would be one of even more limited racial 
plurality.141 
Similarly, in the higher educational context, proponents of affirmative action 
argue that such measures are crucial in aiding racial plurality.142 Some evidence 
does suggest significant costs to racial plurality without affirmative action 
measures in place.143 Certainly in the context of law schools, advocates and critics 
of affirmative action both largely concede the importance of affirmative action in 
aiding the racial diversity of selective law schools.144 Thus, the prevailing 
background assumption of limited racial plurality—absent the state actions under 
discussion in the desegregation and affirmative action cases—is what places the 
judiciary in a posture of either creating or not creating racially pluralistic 
communities in these cases. 
Community-advocates have put forth the preceding arguments, but similar 
background presumptions are apparent in the arguments of community-skeptics as 
well.145 The latter likewise proceed from a shared understanding with their 
opponents that the judicial role in these cases is one of either creating or not 
                                                
140 Id. at 804. (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citations omitted); see also id. at 814–15. For 
a more recent reference to these themes, see Parents Involved in Community Schools v. 
Seattle School District No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 838–43 (2007) (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
141 See Gary Orfield et al., The Resurgence of School Segregation, 60 EDUCATIONAL 
LEADERSHIP 16, 18–19 (2002). 
142 See, e.g., Orfield et al., supra note 141, at 19–20 (explaining the relationship 
between racial and poverty composition of schools and test scores). 
143 THOMAS J. EPENSHADE & ALEXANDRIA WALTON RADFORD, NO LONGER 
SEPARATE, NOT YET EQUAL: RACE AND CLASS IN ELITE COLLEGE ADMISSION AND 
CAMPUS LIFE 346–48 (2009).  
144 Richard Sander, a critic of affirmative action, states, “[t]he most obvious 
disadvantage of [law schools ending their use of racial preferences] is that the most elite 
law schools would have very few black students—probably in the range of 1% to 2% of 
overall student bodies.” Richard H. Sander, A Systemic Analysis of Affirmative Action in 
American Law Schools, 57 STAN. L. REV. 367, 483 (2004).  Not surprisingly, David L. 
Chambers, Timothy T. Clydesdale, William C. Kidder, and Richard O. Lempert and other 
supporters of affirmative action reach the same conclusions even more emphatically. David 
L. Chambers et al., The Real Impact of Eliminating Affirmative Action in American Law 
Schools: An Empirical Critique of Richard Sander’s Study, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1855, 1891–
97 (2005).   
145 KYMLICKA, supra note 138, at 199–237.  
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creating racially pluralistic communities.146 And the best evidence of this shared 
understanding lies in the categorical nature of the critiques by skeptics.147 Hence 
for those more skeptical of community-building in the race and public educational 
context, the primary argument has, for the most part, not been a debate over better 
or worse ways for the state to balance the goal of state promotion of racially 
pluralistic schools versus other state goals—a question that goes to community 
management.148 Rather, the perspective of many skeptics has been more oriented to 
questioning the very legitimacy of a state interest in promoting racial plurality in 
public schools at all.149 
Admittedly, this argumentative posture could imply one of two possible 
positions by skeptics, depending upon their presumptions of default conditions in 
public schools: (a) the skeptical position may be that since there is already 
sufficient racial plurality in America’s public schools as a default matter, the 
                                                
146 Id.  
147 Id. 
148 There are three notable exceptions, however, where members of the Court 
articulated reservations regarding affirmative action that were not categorical. These 
critiques were thus articulated alongside defenses of affirmative action: Powell’s opinion 
for the Court in Regents of University of California v. Bakke 438 U.S. 265, 305–24 (1978) 
(striking down the U.C. Davis Medical School affirmative action program, while upholding 
the use of race as “plus” factor in higher education admissions); O’Connor’s opinion for 
the Court in Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 334–37 (2003) (following Powell’s 
opinion in Bakke in upholding a limited use of race in higher education admissions); and 
Kennedy’s concurrence in Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School 
District No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 788–89 (2007) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and 
concurring in the judgment) (recognizing a qualified interest of local authorities to promote 
integration in public schools). As Kennedy stated:  
 
This Nation has a moral and ethical obligation to fulfill its historic commitment 
to creating an integrated society that ensures equal opportunity for all of its 
children. A compelling interest exists in avoiding racial isolation, an interest that 
a school district, in its discretion and expertise, may choose to pursue. Likewise, 
a district may consider it a compelling interest to achieve a diverse student 
population. Race may be one component of that diversity, but other 
demographic factors, plus special talents and needs, should also be considered. 
What the government is not permitted to do, absent a showing of necessity not 
made here, is to classify every student on the basis of race and to assign each of 
them to schools based on that classification. Crude measures of this sort threaten 
to reduce children to racial chits valued and traded according to one school’s 
supply and another’s demand. 
 
Id. at 797–98. It is telling that each of these opinions constituted, in a sense, the sentiments 
of the swing vote on each of these very sharply divided courts. This suggests that such 
middle-ground reservations have hardly been the norm over the course of the Supreme 
Court’s race and public education jurisprudence. 
149 KYMLICKA, supra note 138, at 199–237.  
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state’s nonintervention in this context would not undermine the existence of 
racially pluralistic schools; or (b) the skeptical position may be that since robust, 
racially pluralistic public schools will largely not exist absent state intervention, 
and since the state interest in actively promoting racially pluralistic schools is 
illegitimate, the existence of racially pluralistic schools should be sacrificed for 
other state interests. Given the stark demographic realities discussed in the 
preceding cases, however, and given that the skeptical judicial opinions in these 
cases are hardly dependent upon strong claims of a robust, default racial plurality 
existing in public schools absent state intervention, I tend to think the second 
argument better describes the position contained in some of the key skeptical 
judicial opinions on desegregation and affirmative action. As such, when these 
opinions critique state interventions in the form of desegregation remedies or 
higher education affirmative action, they ultimately question in a more categorical 
way whether the judiciary should even allow for racially pluralistic communities in 
these schools or not. In other words, these skeptical arguments question the 
judiciary’s role in community-creation. 
Consider then some arguments that question the legitimacy of state actions to 
promote racial plurality in public schools. For example, there is the often-made 
critique of community-skeptics that race-conscious, or “benign,” state actions are 
inherently harmful to broader society in segmenting individuals by race—an 
argument I noted above in Part II.150 Approaching race-conscious remedies at the 
elementary and secondary or higher educational levels with such a presumption 
implies a view of state actions as highly problematic and irregular acts of state 
engineering. The presence of so little concession to the state’s goal of cultivating 
cohesive pluralistic communities in these arguments conveys the significance these 
skeptics attribute to the Court’s rulings in these matters. Further, it suggests a 
belief that the costs of such social engineering are so great that dramatic acts of 
community-building, such as desegregation measures and affirmative action, 
should generally not be undertaken (or, at least, not unless there has been a prior 
state action of discrimination). 
Beyond these potential concerns of race segmentation, other skeptics have 
noted different costs flowing from state actions aimed at community-building 
across race.151 At the elementary and secondary level, white parents of school 
children critiqued federal judicially-mandated desegregation measures—such as 
bussing—decades ago with concerns about their children being forced to attend 
inferior schools.152 Such concerns have carried over to the present day, where the 
prospect of an active state role in creating greater racial plurality in the public 
                                                
150 See supra Part II.    
151 See, e.g., James E. Ryan, Schools, Race, and Money, 109 YALE L. J. 249, 256–57 
(1999) (indicating that racially isolate schools that are primarily composed of minority 
student are costlier to run because poor students typically have greater needs).  
152 MATTHEW D. LASSITER, THE SILENT MAJORITY: SUBURBAN POLITICS IN THE 
SUNBELT SOUTH 9 (2006).  
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schools through measures such as bussing is politically implausible.153 Hence 
James Ryan stated in 1999 that: 
 
It seems unfashionable these days, if not atavistic, to talk seriously about 
ways to increase racial integration. To be sure, one still encounters 
attempts to spark conversations about improving race relations and 
promoting integration, but a strong sense of fatigue seems to accompany 
such attempts.154  
 
And at the higher education level, critics of affirmative action, such as Richard 
Sander, have claimed that such programs “mismatch” affirmative action 
beneficiaries with law schools that teach and have their students compete at levels 
beyond the ability of these beneficiaries.155 He argues that this ultimately imposes 
costs to affirmative action beneficiaries with respect to bar exam passage and/or 
with respect to the job market.156 Justice Thomas has also given voice to this 
critique, stating in his Grutter dissent: 
 
The Law School tantalizes unprepared students with the promise of a 
University of Michigan degree and all of the opportunities that it offers. 
These overmatched students take the bait, only to find that they cannot 
succeed in the cauldron of competition. And this mismatch crisis is not 
restricted to elite institutions. Indeed, to cover the tracks of the 
aestheticists, this cruel farce of racial discrimination must continue—in 
selection for the Michigan Law Review, and in hiring at law firms and 
                                                
153 Ryan, supra note 151, at 257; See also Dale Russakoff, Schooled, THE NEW 
YORKER (May 19, 2014), http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2014/05/19/schooled  
[https://perma.cc/8HLE-NZHN] (providing an in-depth examination of the various reform 
strategies that public school reformers have recently tried in Newark, none of which 
involved bussing with surrounding suburbs of course). 
154 Ryan, supra note 151, at 251. Hence, Ryan focuses on different forms of school 
choice as a more plausible path toward encouraging greater racial diversity in schools. Id. 
at 310–15.   
155 Sander supra note 144, at 449–50, 452. 
156 Id. at 440–42, 445–54, 466–68, 474–75, 478–80. Sander’s argument has garnered 
extensive criticism, both with respect to his methodology and with respect to his larger 
substantive claims. See Ian Ayres & Richard Brooks, Does Affirmative Action Reduce the 
Number of Black Lawyers, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1807, 1808–10 (2005); Chambers et al., supra 
note 144, at 1856–57; Daniel E. Ho, Why Affirmative Action Does Not Cause Black 
Students to Fail the Bar, 114 YALE L.J. 1997, 1997–98 (2005); see also WILLIAM G. 
BOWEN & DEREK BOK, THE SHAPE OF THE RIVER: LONG-TERM CONSEQUENCES OF 
CONSIDERING RACE IN COLLEGE AND UNIVERSITY ADMISSIONS 275–90 (1998) (offering a 
broad data-driven defense of affirmative action); Richard O. Lempert et al., Michigan’s 
Minority Graduates in Practice: The River Runs Through Law School, 25 LAW & SOC. 
INQUIRY 395, 494–504 (2000) (offering another broad data-driven defense of affirmative 
action).    
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for judicial clerkships—until the “beneficiaries” are no longer tolerated. 
While these students may graduate with law degrees, there is no evidence 
that they have received a qualitatively better legal education (or become 
better lawyers) than if they had gone to a less “elite” law school for 
which they were better prepared. And the aestheticists will never address 
the real problems facing “underrepresented minorities,” instead 
continuing their social experiments on other people’s children.157 
 
In sum then, the concerns raised by critics of race-conscious community-building 
measures speak less to the question of how state actions to aid racial plurality can 
be accommodated with competing concerns and more to the question of whether 
public educational communities constituted by race consciousness should exist at 
all. These concerns by skeptics—combined with a background condition likely 
apparent to skeptics that significant racial plurality in public schools relies upon 
integrationist actions by the state158—underscores that the dominant legal question 
here is one of community-creation. That is, should the state create or not create 
these racially diverse communities? By way of further fleshing out this point, let 
me now turn to the religious/ideological doctrinal context, so we might compare 
and contrast the various concerns articulated there with those that we have just 
surveyed in the context of race. 
 
B.  Religion/Ideology and Maintenance in Public Schools 
 
The problems of political community-building in the religious/ideological 
context are conspicuously different from the problems discussed in the racial 
context in at least one key respect: in the former context, the central concerns take 
place against a background assumption of religious plurality existing in public 
schools. Distinct from the worries of segmentation and isolation the dissenting 
Justices voiced in Milliken,159 judges and scholars who focus on 
religious/ideological plurality take as their starting point—and take as their 
primary problem in some ways—the inescapable fact of religious plurality.160 The 
reasons for the existence of such plurality in public schools stems from at least 
three interrelated conditions: compulsory school attendance laws,161 a locality-
                                                
157 Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 372 (2003) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (citations 
omitted). 
158 Orfield et al., supra note 141, at 17–19. 
159 Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 764 (1974) (White, J., dissenting).  
160 Minersville Sch. Dist. v. Gobitis 310 U.S. 586, 593 (1940) overruled by W. Va. 
Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943). 
161 Hence, not surprisingly, compulsory school attendance laws are the starting point 
for many of the controversies underlying the pivotal cases in the religious/ideological 
context. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 207–08 (1972); W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. 
v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 629, 629 n.5, 632 (1943); Gobitis, 310 U.S. at 592; Mozert v. 
Hawkins Cty. Bd. of Educ., 827 F.2d 1058, 1063 (6th Cir. 1987). 
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centric system of public school attendance in America,162 and a relatively less 
geographic segmentation by religion, compared to race, in American society. This 
is not to say that certain religions do not predominate in certain localities or that 
private religious schools are not, and have not been, significant alternatives to 
public schools. But, however much such conditions may subtract from a default 
presence of religious plurality in public schools, it seems safe to say that a fear of 
religious segmentation in public schools has not preoccupied the courts in the same 
manner that fears of racial segmentation have in the past. 
Given that a presumption of plurality underlies the various arguments of 
community-advocates and skeptics in the realm of religion/ideology and public 
schools, this informs a second divergence between religion/ideology and race. If 
the primary point of contestation in the racial context was whether the judiciary 
should allow for the creation of racially pluralistic school communities, the 
primary question in the religious/ideological context is (for the most part) how best 
to manage an already present religious/ideological plurality in public schools. 
Consider first the various arguments of the community-advocates. I discuss a 
rather diverse set of these arguments below, and what ties them all together is a 
relatively similar concern as to how the state may best occupy the middle ground 
in the face of religious plurality. That is, with regard to the state’s actions—
manifested in a local school board’s actions and/or the actions of the federal 
judiciary—how can the state best cultivate a common middle ground between its 
goals and the inevitable objections from individuals, without imposing illegitimate 
burdens on individuals? This fundamentally speaks to a concern regarding 
community management. 
For example, in his opinion for the Court in Minersville School District v. 
Gobitis, Justice Frankfurter offered a defense of the Minersville school board’s 
requirement of a flag salute by teachers and students in the face of religious 
objection from students who were Jehovah’s Witnesses.163 Frankfurter viewed the 
mandatory flag salute as an acceptable middle ground between the competing 
demands of community and respecting religious freedom. On the one hand, core 
rights of the Gobitis children such as their (internal) freedom of conscience, 
speech, and assembly were not endangered by the mandatory flag salute.164 At the 
same time, even though much of his opinion was framed as an act of judicial 
deference to state legislative authority, Frankfurter gave voice to the benefits of the 
mandatory flag salute in its cultivation of national, and by implication local, unity. 
As he stated: “The influences which help toward a common feeling for the 
common country are manifold. Some may seem harsh and others no doubt are 
foolish. Surely, however, the end is legitimate.”165 
                                                
162 See Miliken, 418 U.S. at 741–43.  
163 Minersville Sch. Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 591–92 (1940), overruled by W. 
Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).  
164 Gobitis, 310 U.S. at 600. 
165 Id. at 598; see also id. at 595–600. 
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A second example of community-advocacy along the same lines is Judge 
Lively’s opinion from Mozert. The structure of his argument regarding the 
Hawkins County school board’s choice of curriculum follows in broad strokes the 
Frankfurter approach to the mandatory flag salute. According to Lively, the 
required textbook did not unduly infringe upon the objecting students and their 
parents because it amounted to mere exposure and did not encompass any 
governmental compulsion of the children to engage in conduct contrary to their 
beliefs.166 At the same time, the mandatory readers would serve a community-
enhancing function by teaching critical thinking to all school children and 
providing them with a common ground to engage with one another 
notwithstanding their difference in religious background.167 The teaching of critical 
thinking would serve as a crucial means of managing religious plurality.  
 
The “tolerance of divergent . . . religious views” referred to by the 
Supreme Court is a civil tolerance, not a religious one.168 It does not 
require a person to accept any other religion as the equal of the one to 
which that person adheres. It merely requires recognition that in a 
pluralistic society we must “live and let live.”169   
 
To be sure, the precise mode of managing religious plurality endorsed by 
Lively was distinct from Frankfurter’s defense of the mandatory flag salute. 
Indeed, Lively’s emphasis on the distinction between state-mandated exposure to 
ideas (which he deemed acceptable) and state-mandated conduct like a flag salute 
(which he deemed unacceptable) figured prominently in his opinion.170 Hence he 
explicitly registered his disagreement with Frankfurter’s opinion in Gobitis.171 But 
again, a common and primary emphasis on cultivating community in public 
schools joins both opinions, and both opinions deploy a set of arguments defending 
state actions as acceptable means of managing plurality to enhance community. 
Finally, similar arguments are prominent within the scholarly literature as 
well. Stephen Macedo, for example, sets forth a theory of “civic liberalism” that he 
elaborates upon primarily in the context of public schools and religious plurality 
(Mozert, for example, factors into his analysis more than any other legal case).172 
As with most of the other judges and scholars mentioned in this section, Macedo 
begins with the assumption that deep religious/ideological plurality is 
inescapable.173 Hence, the state should tolerate and accept this fact.174 This is 
                                                
166 Mozert v. Hawkins Cty. Bd. of Educ., 827 F.2d 1058, 1064–66, 1069, 1070 (6th 
Cir. 1987). 
167 Id. at 1060.  
168 Id. at 1069 (citing Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 681 (1986)).   
169 Id.; see also id. at 1068–70. 
170 Id. at 1069–70.  
171 Id. at 1066. 
172 MACEDO, supra note 20, at 181–89. 
173 Id. at 40–50.  
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Macedo’s concession to the religious freedom and autonomy of individuals.175 
However, building upon John Rawls’s theory of “political liberalism,”176 Macedo 
argues that when it comes to democratic governance, the state and its citizens can 
demand that members of the polity converge upon the use of “public reasoning” as 
an acceptable common ground for engagement.177  
Such a norm implies standard liberal norms like reciprocity and toleration for 
one’s fellow citizens.178 As such, “[c]ivic liberals must walk a tightrope, 
emphasizing the great weight of shared political aims but, so far as possible, 
avoiding taking sides on the wider religious dimensions of political matters and 
allowing that reasonable citizens may disagree about their religious and some of 
their basic philosophical views.”179 One can easily see how such an outlook would 
align well with the Lively opinion in Mozert, and indeed, Macedo offered little 
sympathy for the position staked out by the plaintiff-parents in that case: 
 
As a matter of basic principle at least, we have good reason to refuse the 
Mozert families’ request to opt out. If intransigence here appears to be at 
odds with religious freedom, it must be remembered that rightful liberty 
is civil liberty, or liberty that can be guaranteed equally to all. All of us 
must accept limits on our liberty designed to sustain a system of equal 
freedom for all. Each of us can reasonably be asked to surrender some 
control over our own children for the sake reasonable common efforts to 
ensure that all future citizens learn the minimal prerequisites of 
citizenship. There is no right to be exempted from measures necessary to 
secure the freedom of all.180 
 
                                                
174 Id. at 2. 
175 Id. 
176 RAWLS, supra note 17, at 4.  
177 MACEDO, supra note 20, at 169 (citing JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 214 
(1971)). 
178 Id. at 169–72. 
179 Id. at 175. 
180 Id. at 202. For other community-advocacy arguments in the literature, see Amy 
Gutman’s theory of democratic education. Amy Gutman, Undemocratic Education, in 
LIBERALISM AND THE MORAL LIFE 71, 75–81 (Nancy L. Rosenblum ed., 1989) [hereinafter 
Gutman, Undemocratic Education]. Her theory leads her to be critical of the Mozert 
parents. Id. at 81–85; Amy Gutman, Civic Education and Social Diversity, 105 ETHICS 557, 
572–73 (1995) [hereinafter Gutman, Civic Education]. Her theory is critical of the Yoder 
parents as well. Id. at 570; see also Suzanna Sherry, Responsible Republicanism: 
Educating for Citizenship, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 131, 162–65, 170–72 (1995) (asserting that 
schools should serve the goal of making children culturally literate and facilitate a common 
civic-cultural identity among them). See generally GUTMANN, supra note 20 (arguing for a 
democratic approach to education). 
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Macedo’s argument thus speaks to a primary concern of managing diversity within 
a community. 
There are a number of arguments on the more skeptical side of these debates, 
however, where judges and scholars have articulated their ambivalence about 
various state actions undertaken toward community goals in public schools. As 
seen in the cases and scholarly works discussed below, what underlies this 
ambivalence are a range of competing rights and alternative concerns, most of 
which center on religious freedom and parental authority in directing the education 
of children. Yet, for the most part, such skeptical arguments in the 
religious/ideological context converge with the community-advocacy arguments in 
presuming a background condition of religious plurality, and in advocating for 
state action (or nonaction) that encompasses a different way to manage that 
plurality within the public school context.  
In the case of West Virginia Board of Education v. Barnette,181 Justice 
Jackson wrote for the Court in striking down a mandatory flag salute by teachers 
and students adopted by the West Virginia state board of education, and overruled 
the Gobitis ruling.182 Parents of school children who were Jehovah’s Witnesses, 
and who raised a religious objection, again brought the case.183 Notwithstanding 
the potential benefits to national unity that may have underlay a mandatory flag 
salute, Jackson viewed this mode of managing plurality as problematic for several 
key reasons: it encompassed a coercion of the objecting students in violation of 
their First Amendment free speech protections;184 no substantial costs were 
imposed upon others if certain students engaged in peaceful noncompliance with 
the flag salute;185 and ultimately, Jackson suggested that such an exercise would be 
ineffective in cultivating civic and cultural unity.186 As he stated in elaborating on 
the last point:  
 
As governmental pressure toward unity becomes greater, so strife 
becomes more bitter as to whose unity it shall be. Probably no deeper 
division of our people could proceed from any provocation than from 
finding it necessary to choose what doctrine and whose program public 
educational officials shall compel youth to unite in embracing.187 
 
                                                
181 319 U.S. 624 (1943). 
182 Id. at 626–29, 642. 
183 Id. at 629. 
184 Id. at 631–37; see also id. at 645 (Murphy, J., concurring); Minersville School 
Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 601–02, 605–07 (1940) (Stone, J., dissenting) overruled by 
W. Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943). 
185 Barnette, 319 U.S. at 630. 
186 Id. at 640–42; see also id. at 644 (Black, J., and Douglas, J., concurring); id. at 646 
(Murphy, J., concurring). 
187 Id. at 641. 
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However, it is worth emphasizing the concessions to the authority of the state, 
also articulated by Jackson, in shaping a cultural unity out of the religious plurality 
in public schools. Jackson stated “the State may ‘require teaching by instruction 
and study of all in our history and in the structure and organization of our 
government, including the guaranties of civil liberty, which tend to inspire 
patriotism and love of country.’”188 And later in the opinion, he noted that 
“[n]ational unity as an end which officials may foster by persuasion and example is 
not in question.”189 Thus, much as Frankfurter sought to draw an acceptable line 
between religious autonomy and the demands of the state, the same goal is 
apparent in Jackson’s opinion. While the two simply differ on the legitimacy of the 
mandatory flag salute itself, they do converge upon the goal of seeking to manage 
religious plurality between these competing interests of individual autonomy and 
preserving community. 
Similarly, the orientation toward managing, as opposed to creating, religious 
plurality in public schools can be gleaned in the argument of Judge Boggs in 
Mozert. Boggs was the most skeptical among the three Sixth Circuit judges about 
the Hawkins County school board’s actions.190 He was also the most sympathetic 
to the plaintiff-parents among the three judges, even though he ultimately 
concurred in the ruling.191 But Boggs forcefully articulated the limited scope of 
what the parents were demanding: it was not the requirement of new books in the 
curriculum, but a relatively modest opt-out for their children.192 This requested 
accommodation encompassed clear concessions to state authority to otherwise 
structure its public schools. At stake in this disagreement between the plaintiff-
parents and the Hawkins County school board then was mere disagreement over 
better or worse ways to manage the claims of religious difference raised by the 
former. Perhaps with some of these points in mind, the plaintiff-parents did garner 
a degree of sympathy in the scholarly literature, with several authors emphasizing 
the relative modesty and defensibility of an opt-out provision relative to the 
position of the school board in that case.193 
                                                
188 Id. at 631 (quoting Gobitis 310 U.S. at 604 (Stone, J., dissenting)). 
189 Id. at 640. 
190 Mozert v. Hawkins Cty. Bd. of Educ., 827 F.2d 1058, 1073 (6th Cir. 1987) 
(Boggs, J., concurring). 
191 Id. at 1073–74. 
192 Id. at 1074–75. 
193 BATES, supra note 100, at 268–302; Shelley Burtt, Religious Parents, Secular 
Schools: A Liberal Defense of an Illiberal Education, 56 REV. OF POL. 51, 53, 57–58, 65–
66, (1994); Dent, supra note 137, at 923–27. Though it preceded the Mozert opinion by 
about ten years, Hirschoff would likely have been sympathetic to the plaintiff parents too: 
 
Although the state has legitimate interests in preparing youth for citizenship, for 
a vocation, and for a satisfactory personal life, the potential for indoctrination of 
children in the public schools in values which conflict with those of their parents 
necessitates limitations on the power of the state to require instruction. Such 
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A similar observation may be made in the Yoder case. Even though the 
objecting Amish parents prevailed in their desire to withdraw their children from 
public schools, Justice Burger’s opinion for the Court (and the claims of the Amish 
parents as well) proceeded from assumptions of community-management.194 This 
may be gleaned from a notable concession to state authority articulated in the 
Court’s opinion: the Amish parents did not contest the authority of the state in 
compelling school attendance until completion of the eighth grade and the Court 
ruling itself referred to the continuing force of this school attendance 
requirement.195  
The Court offered this more general statement of the state’s authority, 
notwithstanding its ruling in this case:  
 
Nothing we hold is intended to undermine the general applicability of the 
State’s compulsory school-attendance statutes or to limit the power of the 
State to promulgate reasonable standards that, while not impairing the 
free exercise of religion, provide for continuing agricultural vocational 
education under parental and church guidance by the Old Order Amish 
or others similarly situated.196 
 
In short, even though Yoder contemplated a dramatic accommodation of 
religious freedom by allowing for the departure of Amish children from the public 
school community, this was still a ruling that both placed constraints on the scope 
of religious liberty—the Amish children were not given free license to withdraw 
from all school requirements—and that recognized a continuing state interest in 
fashioning community in public schools.197 The orientation of the Court here was 
one of managing the problems of religious plurality posed by the claims of the 
Amish parents. 
Finally, consider a set of skeptical arguments, distinguished from the 
preceding arguments only in their even greater skepticism of the unifying function 
of public schools and in their greater concession to other values such as parental 
                                                
potential indoctrination conflicts with the first amendment’s protection of 
freedom of speech, its implicit protection of freedom of thought and the 
“marketplace of ideas,” and the general principle that our government is a 
government by consent of the governed. To avoid possible indoctrinative 
effects, parents must have a constitutionally protected right to excuse their 
children from instruction which conflicts with their parents’ values. 
 
Mary-Michelle Upson Hirschoff, Parents and the Public School Curriculum: Is There a 
Right to Have One’s Child Excused from Objectionable Instruction?, 50 S. CAL. L. REV. 
871, 957 (1977). 
194 Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 210 (1972). 
195 Id. at 207, 212. 
196 Id. at 236. 
197 See id. at 221. 
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autonomy or diversity. In certain respects, these arguments track familiar themes 
that we have seen elsewhere in the religious/ideological context. Common within 
these arguments is a starting presumption of deep religious or ideological plurality 
that is understood to inevitably intersect with public schools. Hence the motivating 
question remains—as was the case with the community-advocacy and skeptical 
arguments noted above—on how best to manage plurality. 
Yet, as a point of divergence, these—for lack of a better term—“heightened-
skeptics” of community-building in public schools see the most fruitful avenues of 
management to not lie within greater accommodation of religious freedom within 
the public schools.198 Rather, their focus is on schemes that contemplate 
government-subsidized school choice among public, charter, and/or private school 
options.199 Hence if these heightened-skeptics are still focused on themes of 
managing plurality, their version of management is across the range of educational 
options and not simply within the public schools. 
For example, Rosemary Salomone focuses on the problems of plurality that 
are prompted by the concerns of religious conservatives.200 She ultimately 
proposes a three-part framework for elementary and secondary education that is 
more accommodating of religious and ideological plurality than the present 
system: 
 
The proposed model would include a mix of three formats of 
government-supported schools operating under state education statutes: 
publicly funded and controlled public schools in their current form under 
the auspices of local school boards, some or all of which may introduce 
family choice strategies within the geographical bounds of a state-
established school district; public charter schools funded directly by 
government and managed by outside groups under the sponsorship of a 
legislatively designated governmental entity; and private choice schools, 
including religiously affiliated institutions, funded through voucher 
payments provided by the state to parents who demonstrate economic 
need.201 
 
To be sure, Salomone gives some weight to the state’s interest in forging societal 
unity—hence the presence of public schools in her three-part scheme. Her scheme 
also encompasses state authority and oversight over the entire proposed system, 
recognizing that “[e]ven private choice schools partially funded through 
government tuition subsidies to parents would be prohibited from teaching or 
acting in any way that undermines the nation’s overarching commitment to racial 
                                                
198 See ROSEMARY C. SALOMONE, VISIONS OF SCHOOLING: CONSCIENCE, 
COMMUNITY, AND COMMON EDUCATION 5–8 (2000).  
199 See id.  
200 Id. at 6. 
201 Id. at 256. 
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equality or political commitment to gender equality (within the reasonable bounds 
of religious beliefs), [and] to religious tolerance.”202 But the primary thrust of her 
proposal is her assertion that plurality may best be managed by allowing for the 
separation of diverse constituencies.203 Her scheme would allow for community 
cohesiveness, but in a segmented form and not just through public educational 
institutions. She states that in her model “community is not necessarily defined by 
residence but by a shared sense of purpose . . . [an] education built on a shared 
worldview, provided [the coalesced family groups] adhere to core political 
commitments, the value of civil toleration, and specified academic performance 
standards.”204 
In a similar vein, Michael McConnell has also endorsed a government-
subsidized school choice scheme out of a similar concern for religious and 
ideological plurality.205 Such a scheme would encompass a greater respect for the 
religious and ideological values of parents than the status quo educational system, 
though McConnell would also retain a role for state oversight.206 Perhaps even 
more than Salomone, however, McConnell’s argument is motivated by a deeper 
skepticism of the value of public schools in managing religious/ideological 
plurality. As he states: 
  
                                                
202 Id. at 257. 
203 Id. at 7–8.  
204 Id. at 264. 
205 Michael W. McConnell, Education Disestablishment: Why Democratic Values Are 
Ill-Served by Democratic Control of Schooling, in MORAL AND POLITICAL EDUCATION 87, 
87–88 (Stephen Macedo & Yael Tamir eds., 2002) [hereinafter McConnell, Education 
Disestablishment]. I should note, McConnell does also address racial plurality in a 
tangential way in his arguments on education. For example, he speaks approvingly of the 
possibility of Afrocentric charter or private schools as a component of his scheme for 
segmenting elementary and secondary education. Michael W. McConnell, 
Multiculturalism, Majoritarianism, and Educational Choice: What Does Our 
Constitutional Tradition Have to Say?, 1991 U. CHI. LEGAL. F. 123, 125–28, 149–51 (1991) 
[hereinafter McConnell, Multiculturalism]. Still, even when he incorporates racial plurality 
into his argument, it is clear that his primary focus is on religious plurality. This is why I 
situate his argument within the religious/ideological context. 
206 McConnell, Education Disestablishment, supra note 205, at 87–88. 
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Until relatively recently, the common schools were able to communicate 
an effective brand of democratic values, but that was because they were 
not squeamish about embracing a particular worldview—the Protestant. 
It is unlikely that this can be replicated under modern conditions of 
increased diversity in society and increased assertiveness by minority 
groups. A modern public school faces two choices: either it adopts a 
comprehensive doctrine and thus abandons its claims to being a liberal 
institution, or it avoids comprehensive doctrines and abandons the hope 
of supplying a morally coherent structure for its teaching of democratic 
values.207 
 
These arguments of heightened-skeptics share one thing in common with skeptical 
arguments in the racial context: both seemingly question the value of plurality 
within the public school.208 Yet, unlike community-skeptics in the racial context, 
we very clearly see from Salomone and McConnell a sense that the task of 
managing religious/ideological plurality is a crucial one for the state—hence, their 
focus on schemes that would manage plurality by allowing different communities 
to educate their children in a more segmented fashion.209 
 
IV.  PLURALITY WITHIN COMMUNITY 
 
As is implied by the discussion in Part III, I view the main reason for the 
greater judicial focus on community-creation in the race context and community-
maintenance in the religious/ideological context as stemming from default 
conditions on population distribution. Compulsory school attendance laws and the 
relatively greater geographic dispersion of different religious/ideological 
constituencies within American society—compared to the dispersal of certain 
racial minorities—have allowed for a default condition of relative plurality in 
American public schools along religious/ideological lines that is not true for race. 
Thus, I view the association of creation-race and maintenance-religion/ideology as 
being not necessarily intrinsic to those dimensions of identity, but rather more 
directly related to how those particular identities have tended to intersect with 
geographic patterns in American life.210 
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209 For another argument in a similar vein, see Stephen G. Gilles, On Educating 
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210 I do qualify the preceding statement by saying “not necessarily.” One might argue 
that the relatively greater geographic segmentation along racial lines in American life, 
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By way of illustrating this point, let us return to the example of Yale 
University. In this particular incident, the focus of student activism and 
administrative response was largely on matters of racial difference (with perhaps 
some discussion of ideological plurality too). Yet the problem of plurality 
confronting Yale is, I would submit, not a creation problem but a community-
maintenance problem—namely, how best to manage diverse claims of equality, 
dignity, and respect within an already racially pluralistic university community. 
Indeed in its profile for the class of 2019, Yale reported that “42.5% of freshmen 
are US citizens or Permanent Residents from [racial/ethnic] minority groups” and 
that 64% of students received some financial aid.211 This background condition of 
relatively high racial plurality at Yale might be traced to its highly selective and 
deliberate admissions process, and its policy of need-blind admissions212—both of 
                                                
compared to religion, could suggest that there is indeed something intrinsic to those 
identities driving geographic segmentation, and thus indirectly causing the 
creation/maintenance distinction between racial and religious/ideological plurality in public 
schools. While I am more confident in asserting the importance of geographic patterns in 
causing the above noted distinction, I do not offer an answer on this latter question. 
211 Yale College Class of 2020: Freshman Class Profile, YALE.EDU, 
http://admissions.yale.edu/sites/default/files/files/class_profile_2019_final.pdf [https://per
ma.cc/Z7JU-CB2B]. 
212 On “What Yale Looks For” in its admissions process, the Yale College admissions 
website states: 
 
We estimate that over three quarters of the students who apply for admission to 
Yale are qualified to do the work here. Between two and three hundred students 
in any year are so strong academically that their admission is scarcely ever in 
doubt. But here is the thing to know: the great majority of students who are 
admitted stand out from the rest because a lot of little things, when added up, tip 
the scale in their favor. So what matters most in your application? Ultimately, 
everything matters. The good news in that is that when so many little things 
figure into an admissions decision, it is fruitless to worry too much about any 
one of them. 
... 
 
We convene a committee of experienced admissions officers, Yale faculty, and 
Yale deans to select applicants who have shown exceptional engagement, 
ability, and promise. 
 
Transcripts, test scores, essays, and recommendations help paint a picture not 
only of a student’s accomplishments to date but also of the ways in which an 
applicant has taken advantage of the opportunities available to him or her. For 
example, does your school offer AP courses, an International Baccalaureate 
program, neither, or both? We only expect you to take advantage of such 
courses if your high school provides them. 
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which have undoubtedly been crucial in allowing the university to construct a 
community of students quite unlike the typical public school community.  
The Yale example thus illustrates the potential for community-maintenance 
themes to travel with problems of racial plurality as well as religious/ideological 
plurality. (It may also indicate perhaps the extreme measures often needed to turn 
problems of racial plurality into community-maintenance problems too.) But 
beyond this, the Yale example is also useful in exploring my third and final 
assertion in this Article: for community-builders, problems of maintenance are 
generally preferable to problems of community-creation. This is not to say that 
lines of division within a community may not, at times, be as deep or troubling as 
lines of division that correspond to community-creation issues. Nor am I implicitly 
suggesting that religious/ideological differences in America have uniformly been 
less intense or problematic than racial differences.   
Rather, the basis for my claim is merely that however deep the lines of 
division may be within an already recognized or accepted community, one tool 
may remain available for community-builders to bridge differences in that context 
that will not be available in the community-creation context: the potential of a 
common culture based upon experiences, reference points, places, individuals, and 
events that can widely be viewed as common among all community members. This 
common culture, as defined by these components is, in essence, a great part of 
what was being referenced by the Yale Intercultural Affairs Committee, associate 
master Erika Christakis, President Salovey, and the students who, angered by the 
Christakis email, all invoked a desire for substantive communal engagement. And 
this common culture provides all members of the community a means—in a sense 
a language—to genuinely engage with one another.   
Put in more concrete terms, grappling with the multitude of issues intertwined 
with questions of racial inclusion and exclusion is obviously a tall order in any 
context. But in the case of a university community like Yale, framing those 
                                                
Again, we are looking for students who will make the most of Yale and the most 
of their talents. Knowing how you’ve engaged in the resources and opportunities 
at your high school gives us an expectation of how you might engage the 
resources at Yale if admitted. 
 
In selecting future Yale students, President Brewster wrote, “I am inclined to 
believe that the person who gives every ounce to do something superbly has an 
advantage over the person whose capacities may be great but who seems to have 
no desire to stretch them to their limit.” Within the context of each applicant’s 
life and circumstances, we look for that desire and ability to stretch one’s limits. 
 
What Yale Looks For, YALE.EDU, http://admissions.yale.edu/what-yale-looks-for 
[https://perma.cc/ZWG9-5ZV4]. On its financial aid policy, the website states: “Yale 
admits students without regard to their ability to pay and meets 100% of demonstrated 
financial need. For all students. Without loans.” Financial Aid At-A-Glance, YALE.EDU, 
http://admissions.yale.edu/financial-aid [https://perma.cc/5CJW-U9Z4].  
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concerns within the very grounded context of Halloween costumes, or the legacy 
of racism in named campus buildings, provides an entry point for these incredibly 
difficult questions where students can draw on common reference points, common 
events, and common spaces. As the Yale debates themselves indicate, one 
probably errs in thinking that there is anything like a universal student experience 
at Yale or any other university campus. The dilemmas of plurality obviously do 
not disappear within a community. Yet, if communities possess a strong enough 
culture with sufficient engagement between diverse groups, the perception of at 
least some points of commonality may facilitate communal cohesiveness—such as 
some sense that on certain things, “just about every student at Yale knows ‘x,’ or is 
aware of ‘y,’ or has seen ‘z,” or has had a particular reaction to something “well-
known” in their lives at Yale. The belief of certain points of commonality (the 
substance of which will undoubtedly vary from student to student and will likely 
change over time) allows for dialogue on plurality to begin and for claims to be 
made and heard in a community. Thus, the culture within a community provides a 
potential means of engaging with plurality that is absent where no community 
exists on a particular point of disagreement.   
In noting the potential of a common culture to serve as an adhesive for 
plurality within a community, my claim both converges and diverges from a 
related argument put forth by Jonathan Zimmerman. In his book, Whose America?, 
Zimmerman examines the theme of racial and religious plurality in public schools 
by focusing on debates over school curricula and textbooks over much of the 
twentieth century.213 Among other things, Zimmerman concludes by noting that 
the problems of religious plurality in this context have been somewhat more 
vexing relative to race.214 The conflicts driven by racial plurality can—and have 
been—mitigated by the repeated strategy of including more and more 
representatives of each minority group into an overarching, unifying historical 
narrative of American progress in history textbooks. In other words, a narrative of 
American history and progress is possible that can subsume racial plurality. In 
contrast, given the apparently more intractable nature of religious plurality in this 
context—according to Zimmerman—no such strategy in history textbooks has 
been available along the religious dimension.215 To quote Zimmerman on this 
point: 
 
Despite shrill warnings by a wide range of polemicists, the inclusion of 
racial and ethnic minorities in textbooks did not dilute America’s 
majestic national narrative. Instead, these fresh voices were folded into 
the old story, echoing a century-long pattern of challenge, resistance, and 
                                                
213 JONATHAN ZIMMERMAN, WHOSE AMERICA?: CULTURE WARS IN THE PUBLIC 
SCHOOLS 2–8 (2002). 
214 Id. at 7–8.  
215 Id. at 6–8, 214–22. I should note, however, that Zimmerman is himself critical of 
this approach to teaching history. Id. at 224–25. 
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co-option. On the religion front, compromise proved far more elusive. 
Reflecting Americans’ essential beliefs about God and the universe, 
religious principles simply could not be reconciled in an additive, come-
one-come-all fashion. Conflicts over history textbooks generally 
occurred within a shared set of assumptions about American civic 
tradition. But religious disputes often lacked this common language, a 
lack that accounts for their vehemence as well as their persistence.216 
 
To the extent that Zimmerman’s argument may be instructive for problems of 
American community-building more broadly, his conclusions only partially 
converge with mine. Zimmerman is onto something in noting the strategy of 
ameliorating conflict by expanding inclusivity with respect to racial questions in 
history textbooks.217 By giving members of more racial groups a part in the 
overarching historical narrative of American progress, racial conflicts over school 
curricula can be situated within a common reference point (in a way that religious 
conflicts have apparently not been situated). This aligns, I believe, with my claim 
on the benefits of managing plurality within a community.   
Yet Zimmerman’s argument does not speak to forms of unity that may be 
rooted not in larger civic narratives, but in culture and common experiences. For 
this reason, his argument perhaps overlooks the possibility of cultural adhesives to 
bridge gaps across racial or religious differences—even if some of those 
differences may be based on seemingly intractable points of belief. Thus, if the 
problems of racial plurality look different at Yale because of the presence of a 
university community and culture, it seems clear that the problems of 
religious/ideological difference in many public schools have often looked different 
than religious/ideological conflicts outside schools—for a similar reason. The 
mechanisms for managing religious/ideological plurality in many public schools 
have not been solely dependent upon the creation of unifying civic narratives. 
Rather, at least one crucial adhesive mechanism has been the creation of a common 
culture within the public school that binds diverse students together. A common 
culture can manage plurality by softening the edges of disagreement, providing 
alternative grounds for cohesion, providing a means of mutual respect and empathy 
across major societal fault lines, or by providing a means for the major fault lines 
to be put aside and ignored for other topics—such as parent-teacher-student 
discussion of school dress codes, or the cost of extracurricular activities, or the 
availability of certain advanced classes, or school pride in athletic teams.  
If a common culture may indeed provide adhesive benefits to overcome 
community-maintenance problems, this point takes us back to the key insight 
discussed in Part II: that public schools provide a valuable function in bringing 
diverse students together into close physical proximity. Yet, while the Court 
focused on abstract values such as citizenship, toleration, building good character, 
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or facilitating student exposure to diversity, one other benefit flows from this 
interaction that, as we have seen, has been strongly implied by the Court: such 
interaction facilitates the creation of shared experiences and common cultural 
reference points for students from diverse backgrounds. 
 
V.  CONCLUSION 
 
In this article, I have examined some of the central cases on race and public 
education, and religion/ideology and public education as a means of exploring 
crucial themes of unity and plurality in the American political community. My 
examination of these cases has led me to three claims: first, judicial conceptions of 
community in these opinions demonstrate a belief that public schools can help 
facilitate community across both racial and religious/ideological lines. Second, 
these opinions also demonstrate a point of divergence: judicial arguments in the 
racial context were more preoccupied with problems of community-creation, while 
in the religious/ideological context, judicial arguments demonstrate a relatively 
greater concern with community-maintenance. Finally, the problem of 
maintenance is a relatively easier problem for community-builders because it 
offers the possibility of a common culture serving as an adhesive across lines of 
division within the community.   
Thus, even if we cannot expect deep plurality to disappear from American 
society, state actors who are concerned with bridging differences and finding 
grounds for unity may want to consider some of these issues to be evolving rather 
than persistent problems. That is, a problem of community-creation may—if a 
community subsequently takes hold—eventually become a problem of community-
maintenance. Such an evolution should give community-builders cause for 
optimism in certain contexts: if such a situation occurs, even inescapable problems 
of plurality may become easier to manage within a community, relative to the 
kinds of problems that may persist between communities. 
